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INTRODUCTION

This Article provides a descriptive and normative exploration of the prophylactic remedy. The prophylactic
remedy imposes specific measures directing defendant's legal conduct affiliated with the proven wrong to prevent
future harm.' Federal courts have utilized prophylactic
remedies for over forty years.2 Prophylaxis has become the
remedy of choice for violations of intangible rights protecting constitutional, personal, and community values because
of its effectiveness in preventing harm that is otherwise difficult to redress.3 However, prophylactic remedies remain
amorphous, unknown concepts in the eyes of most lawyers
and academics. Few legal treatises or casebooks mention
prophylaxis, and those that do obfuscate rather than clarify
the understanding of prophylaxis.4 The Supreme Court has
often endorsed prophylactic remedial decrees, yet as in the
1. See ELAINE W. SHOBEN & WILLIAM MURRAY TABB, REMEDIES: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 246 (2d ed. 1995); Tracy A. Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic
Remedies Through the Looking Glass of Bush v. Gore, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.

J. 343, 344-45 (2002) [hereinafter ProphylacticRemedies].
2. The first example of the imposition of a remedy of prophylactic character
was in 1963 in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180

(1963). There the Supreme Court upheld a preliminary, prophylactic injunction
to prevent securities fraud requiring an investment advisor to disclose to his
clients his own personal dealings in securities recommended to the clients. Id.
at 193; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 457 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Indeed, the United States argues that '[pirophylactic rules are now
and have been for many years a feature of this Court's constitutional
adjudication.' That statement is not wholly inaccurate, if by 'many years' one
means since the mid-1960's.") (alteration in the original) (citing Brief for the
United States at 47); Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding ConstitutionalRights:
The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 926 (1999)

("My review of the case law reveals a long history of judicial creation of prophylactic rules, but a lack of self-conscious judicial examination of their legitimacy.").
3. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (upholding
prophylactic remedy in abortion protest case); Women Prisoners v. D.C. Dep't of
Corrs., 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994) (imposing extensive prophylactic
remedies to address inequality, sexual harassment, and unconstitutional conditions in women's prisoners). See also cases discussed infra pp. 121-22, 170-74
and accompanying text; Landsberg, supra note 2, at 930 (noting that "prophylactic rules have become increasingly popular with the judicial" branch because
they provide a maximal remedy, effectively achieve the desired resulted, and
simply enforcement of constitutional values).
4. See DOUGLAS

LAYCOCK,

MODERN

AMERICAN

REMEDIES:

CASES

AND

MATERIALS 282-89 (3d ed. 2002); DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., REMEDIES: PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE 131-34 (3d ed. 2002); SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 1, at 246.
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case of most remedial decisions, has omitted explanation of
the principles, parameters, and theoretical justifications for
the equitable remedy.5
This Article attempts to fill this theoretical and doctrinal void. The primary aim of the Article is to enable
courts, lawyers, and scholars to understand the reality of
the prophylactic remedies that are available and frequently
ordered against defendants. The second, more ambitious
goal of this Article, is to create the doctrinal and theoretical
basis to dispel the prevailing belief that prophylaxis is
merely the arbitrary, personal activism of the individual
judge.'
The existing construct of prophylaxis dominating the
scholarship is one of unprincipled judicial activism. Prophylaxis has been conceptualized by its opponents, 8 as well
5. In addition, only a few scholarly articles have addressed the principles or
doctrinal parameters of a prophylactic remedy in the forty years since its
inception. See Landsberg, supra note 2, at 926-27 (discussing judicial prophylactic "rules" not directly sanctioned or required by the Constitution that are
adopted to ensure that the government follows constitutionally required rules);
David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace
Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 671-82
(1988) (discussing the court's ability to give more than the plaintiffs rightful
position through prophylactic relief when necessary to remedy the violation).
6. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 133 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("I believe that we must impose more precise standards and guidelines on the
federal equitable power, not only to restore predictability to the law and reduce
judicial discretion, but also to ensure that constitutional remedies are actually
targeted toward those who have been injured."); Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at
629-30 ("Without principles to guide the exercise of equitable discretion, the
judge acts as a policy maker in framing the remedy, which throws into question
the legitimacy of the judicial power to grant [prophylactic remedies].").
7. See generally Joseph D. Grano, ProphylacticRules in Criminal Procedure:
A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100 (1985) (arguing that
prophylactic rules in the criminal and constitutional context are illegitimate
exercises of judicial power); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's
Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1121 (1996) (constituting the classic modern work arguing that structural and
prophylactic injunctions violate principles of judicial restraint).
8.See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 465 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the imposition of a "Court-made code" upon Congress
and the States); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 741 (1969) (Black, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing prophylactic rule of case
as "pure legislation if there ever was legislation"); cf WILLIAM LASSER, THE
LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS

222-43

(1988) (describing former Attorney General Edwin Meese's criticism of the
modern Court as being "in the habit of deciding cases based upon what they
think 'constitutes sound public policy,' rather than on 'a deference to what the
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as by some proponents,9 as judicial policymaking or lawmaking by which the judge in public law litigation accomplishes the "social good" of preserving constitutional values
by imposing her own views upon the defendant. ° Even the
first academics to endorse prophylaxis in concept, if not by
name, adopted the judicial activism construct to describe
the types of injunctive remedies emerging from the courts."
However, this notion of judges as dictators of social policy
and the managers of governmental institutions raises insti12
tutional concerns of separation of powers and federalism.
Constitution-its text and intention-may demand."') (quoting Elder Witt, A
Different Justice: Reagan and the Supreme Court, CONG. Q. 176 (1986)); Alfred
M. Mamlet, Reconsiderationof Separationof Powers and the BargainingGame:
Limiting the Policy Discretion of Judges and Plaintiffs in InstitutionalSuits, 33
EMORY L. J. 685, 685-86 (1985) (arguing that courts' issuance of affirmative
injunctions addressing subsidiary policy problems related to the legal violation
is an exercise of legislative or executive discretion which belongs to majoritarian bodies).
9. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING
AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 1-25
(1998) (arguing that judges do and should engage in judicial policy making and
describing such policy making in the context of prison reform litigation); Abram
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1302 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword:The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1,
2 (1979) [hereinafter Justice]; Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge
Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 2010, 2011 (1997). But see Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 671 (disagreeing
that judges engage in extra-judicial policy making when imposing prophylactic
relief).
10. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 9, at 5 ("Policy making, by a judge or
anyone else, is the process by which officials exercise power on the basis of their
judgment that their actions will produce socially desirable results ....[while]
interpretation.., is the process by which public officials exercise power on the
basis of a preexisting legal source that they regard as authoritative.").
11. See Chayes, supra note 9; Justice,supra note 9.
12. See Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal
Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978); Thomas, Prophylactic
Remedies, supra note 1, at 362-64 (summarizing the institutional criticisms of
prophylactic relief); cf Colin Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker, 65 VA.
L. REV. 43, 89 (1979) ("Nevertheless, despite the ease with which we may view
the judge as occasional social policymaker or community conscience, the prospect of a judge intervening actively in governmental politics offends cherished
images of the judicial function. The role of powerbroker implies a degree of
partisanship, manipulation, and guesswork offensive to accepted judicial virtues of neutrality, passivity, and objectivity. Moreover, it sanctions a degree of
judicial intrusion into the political process that conflicts sharply with values
inherent in federalism and separation of powers."); Ernest A. Young, Judicial
Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1142-43 (2002)
(defining judicial activism as a concern over the institutional role of the judge in
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Commentators have attacked the competency and legitimacy of courts to impose prophylactic measures that create
new legal obligations of public import outside the democratic process of the legislature. 3
This Article disagrees with the argument that remedial
decisionmaking is policymaking somehow different from the
accepted authority of the court to make decisions about fact
or law, and therefore illegitimate.'4 Other commentators as
well have concluded that prophylactic remedies are a legitimate use of the judicial power. 5 The point of this Article,
relation to other actors in the system). The separation of powers concerns are
that in imposing prophylactic relief the court oversteps its Article III authority
to decide cases only by engaging in policymaking extrinsic to the litigation and
in so doing displaces the legislature's designated and more appropriate expertise in policymaking through a democratic forum. See Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 454 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing adoption of
prophylactic rules "flagrantly offends fundamental principles of separation of
powers, and arrogates to [the Court] prerogatives reserved to the representatives of the people"). The federalism concerns arise out of the picture of the
federal court directing the conduct of state institutions through injunctive
commands. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 454 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 384-88 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring); Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
13. See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAw 173-98 (1993)
(attacking legitimacy of the prophylactic rule of Miranda);LASSER, supra note 8,
at 222-26; Grano, supra note 7, at 105; Nagel, supra note 12, at 661; Thomas
Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the ConstitutionalCommon Law, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1127-29 (1978) (suggesting that prophylactic rulemaking
invades congressional power to legislate and executive powers to define law enforcement methods and violates federal judicial power to displace state law);
Yoo, supra note 7, at 1151-70. But see Thomas, ProphylacticRemedies, supra
note 1, at 374-80 (arguing that prophylaxis is a legitimate exercise of the
federal judiciary's Article III power); accord Landsberg, supra note 2, at 926.
14. See Honorable William Wayne Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial
Activism, Address at the George Washington University National Law Center
(Mar. 10, 1992), in 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1992) ("The propriety of a
detailed remedy comes from the judicial office itself. The Supreme Court has
said, time and again, that once a constitutional violation is found, a federal
court is required to tailor the scope of the remedy to fit the nature and extent of
the injury. Similar to its duty to say what the law is, a court's obligation to ensure full compliance with the law is nothing new.") [hereinafter Justice Speech];
Thomas, ProphylacticRemedies, supra note 1, at 360-80.
15. See Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of "Prophylactic"
Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002); Landsberg, supra note 2, at 949-63
(arguing the prophylactic rules, including prophylactic injunctions, are supported by the general Marbury power and the "nature of our constitution [and]
the nature of courts"); Henry Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1975) (finding judicial authority for prophylactic
rules in constitutional cases from the "constitutional common law" comprised of
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however, is to reveal the inaccuracy of the assumptions
about prophylaxis upon which these criticisms are based.
Revealing the inaccuracy of the foundational assumptions
supporting these politicized criticisms of public law injunctions begins to erode the existing academic and political
bias against such commonly-used judicial remedies. The
launching points for the attacks on the legitimacy of prophylactic relief are the allegations that the judicial response
is unprincipled, unpredictable, and unconstrained by the
rule of law." None of these allegations prove true. To the
contrary, this Article's review of prophylaxis and the way in
which it has been utilized by judges of all political stripes
for nearly half a century demonstrates that prophylaxis operates under precise doctrinal principles formulating conby which it is cautiously imposed when
sistent standards
17
necessary.
The existing case law reveals common trans-substantive remedial principles guiding the courts in their choice of
prophylaxis and unified theories supporting the legitimacy
a series of remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from various
constitutional provisions); Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 671; David A. Strauss,
The Ubiquity of ProphylacticRules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190 (1988) (arguing
that prophylactic "rules" are not exceptional measures of questionable legitimacy but are a central and necessary feature of constitutional law); cf Michael
C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared ConstitutionalInterpretation,2000 SuP. CT.
REV. 71, 73 n.47 (stating there is consensus that prophylaxis is legitimate and
the reason is no longer important).
16. See LASSER, supranote 8, at 222-26.
17. Cf. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 9, at 19 ("The prison cases represented
the collective actions of literally hundreds of federal judges, acting individually.
These judges were not fire-breathing radicals, or the minions of an occupying
foreign power; they were not captured by some narrow special interest group,
nor did they meet in secret conclave to concoct their plans. They were middle-ofthe-road, upper-middle-class Americans, largely white and male, appointed by
Republican and Democratic presidents. They did not even take their cues from
the Supreme Court, the usual villain for critics of judicial activism .... There
was no Brown, Miranda,or Roe v. Wade to generate a sudden shift in doctrine
and provide the explanation that a few idiosyncratic individuals had exercised
their will .... If these cases represented such a wholesale violation of true
principles for constraining judicial behavior, why were so many federal judges
willing to decide them, and with such apparent unanimity? .... Although much
of this literature has merit [challenging public remedies as violative of separation of powers], its frequent conclusion that the federal judges overstepped their
authority is somewhat implausible. It is implausible that so large a group of
government officials, in so many different regions, acting independently of one
another over such an extended period of time, would stray so far from the accepted path.").
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of the remedy.18 Discerning these core principles and rules
for prophylactic relief demonstrates, perhaps for the first
time, that a common remedy with overarching remedial
rules is at play in each of these cases of prophylaxis. The establishment of trans-substantive remedial principles has
been one of the key goals of modern remedies scholarship as
the law of remedies has been too often compartmentalized
as specific rules limited by the nature of the claim. 9 This
holdover from the English common law writ system, in
which right and remedy were intertwined in the particular
writ requested, has delayed the development of an advanced understanding of the law of remedies."0 For what
has become apparent is that there are in fact common remedial rules that apply in all cases just as there are common
procedural rules that apply regardless of the nature of the

18. The principles that emerge are trans-substantive in the sense that they
transcend the particular substantive type of claim at issue in the case and
instead apply equally to all cases involving the application of prophylactic relief.
As Professor Schoenbrod has noted, "the transsubstantive principles of remedies are sometimes not well stated in the case law or recognized in the various
research aids that lawyers use. This makes it particularly difficult for lawyers
who have not studied remedies or who have done so in a 'cookbook' fashion to
locate or apply the law that they need to help their clients. They are unable, for
instance, to deal with a novel remedies question by drawing appropriate analogies to remedies from other substantive areas of the law." SCHOENBROD, supra
note 4, at 3. However, the Supreme Court's approach to public law remedies is
generally transsubstantive, as principles applied in one area are applied in
other contexts as well. Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law
Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L. J. 475, 507 (1999).
19. See Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 631-32. For discussions of the transsubstantive tradition in remedies literature, see SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 3
("[Remedies-like civil procedure, administrative law, evidence, or conflicts of
law-is 'transsubstantive': the problems it addresses arise in all substantive
areas of law. Although the substantive law affects how remedies issues are
resolved, just as the substantive law affects the outcome of procedural or evidentiary questions, this issues themselves are universal."); see also DOUGLAS
LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE

(1991); Gene Shreve,

The PrematureBurial of the IrreparableInjury Rule, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1063, 1070
(1992) (reviewing Laycock's article favorably with respect to its assertion of
trans-substantive rules of remedies).
20. See Dean Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 20,
26-27 (1905) (calling compartmentalization on injunctive relief "the decadence
of equity" because the purpose of equity's flexibility gets lost in subject-specific
-rules); Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 632, 654 (arguing that recognition of transsubstantive principles for measuring injunctive relief will assist judges in
identifying relevant issues and arguments and in making decisions on the basis
of principle rather than policy).
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claim.2 ' Never has the problem been more apparent than in
the context of prophylaxis where commentators have confined the discussion of prophylaxis to the narrow, ancillary
contexts of Miranda" and First Amendment overbreadth.
In support of the trans-substantive theory of remedies,
this Article will begin in Part I by identifying the principles
of prophylactic relief demarcating its unique character and
scope. ' These rules, derived from the existing Supreme
21. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly
Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-trans-substantiveRules
of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2067-68 (1989); Robert M. Cover,
ForJames Wm.Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J.
718 (1975); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237 (1989).
However, the debate regarding the general or specific applicability of rules of
procedure has moved from claim specific, to trans-substantive, and back to
claim specific. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury:
Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 1030 (2000)
(noting that "the enthusiasm in the 1930s for trans-substantive rules has given
way to a preference for rules distinguishing among cases," and providing
examples of prison litigation, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2000), securities litigation, 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000), complex litigation, and habeas litigation, 28 U.S.C. §
2254 (2000)). But see Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading,81 TEX. L.
REV. 551 (2002) (arguing against subject-specific procedure changes that
jeopardize the essence of trans-substantive rules of procedure).
22. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 15; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicial
Legitimacy and the Unwritten Constitution: A Comment on Miranda and
Dickerson, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 119 (2001-02); Grano, supra note 7; David
Huitema, Miranda: LegitimateResponse to Contingent Requirements of the Fifth
Amendment, 18 YALE L. & POLY REV. 261 (2000); Susan R. Klein, Identifying
and (Re)FormulatingProphylacticRules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights
in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030 (2001); Richard
H.W. Maloy, Can a Rule be Prophylactic and Yet Constitutional?, 27 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 2465 (2001); David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution,
and Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958 (2001); Strauss, supra note 15. In the
context of prophylaxis, Miranda can be viewed at its more general level as a
case about constitutional law broadly, encompassing both criminal and civil
rights, rather than narrowly as a case about criminal rights.
23. See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment
Overbreadth, and Improper Legislative Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31
(2003) (criticizing the Court's decision in Hill v. Colorado upholding
prophylactic legislation that restricted the free speech rights of anti-abortion
protests); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J.
853 (1991) (describing a prophylactic theory of First Amendment overbreadth);
Melissa L. Saunders, Reconsidering Shaw: The Miranda of Race-Conscious
Districting,109 YALE L. J. 1603 (2000); Daniel P. Tokaji, PoliticalEquality After
Bush v. Gore: A First Amendment Approach to Voting Rights, in THE FINAL
ARBITER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF BUSH V. GORE IN LAW AND POLITICS

(forthcoming SUNY Press).
24. See infra Part I.
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Court case law, define prophylaxis as injunctive relief composed of measures directing the legal conduct of defendant
that contributes to the established harm. The prophylactic
measures address facilitators of the harm or its prevention,
and typically include specific measures requiring polices,
training, monitoring, notice, or process.25 However, the
court's ability to impose broad injunctive relief reaching defendant's affiliated legal conduct beyond the illegal action
itself is not unlimited. Prophylactic remedies have been upheld only where the enjoining of affiliated conduct is necessary to achieve the aim of remedying an illegality. 26 The
measures included in prophylaxis have also been restricted
to including affiliated conduct only where that conduct has
a sufficient causal nexus to the legal harm." This nexus is
demonstrated by showing that the affiliated conduct shares
a corresponding factual issue with the illegality and that
the relationship is sufficiently close to justify its inclusion
in the relief as measured by common notions of foreseeability and proximate cause."
These limitations on prophylactic remedies gleaned
from the case law requiring both proper means and ends
become clearer when compared to the analogous limitations
imposed by the Court in the related area of prophylactic
legislation.2 1 "Prophylactic legislation" is legislation passed
by Congress pursuant to its remedial power under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizing Congress to enforce constitutional rights." As in the case of judicial remedies, the Court has endorsed the use of broad prophylactic
legislation to prevent complex legal problems by proscribing
facially legal conduct. 3' However, just as with judicial reme25. See infra Part I.B.
26. See infra Part I.C.1.
27. See infra Part I.C.2.
28. See infra Part I.C.2.
29. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see infra text
accompanying notes 150-62 & 206-26.
30. See Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727 (2003)
("Congress may enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially
constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
31. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737 ("Congress is not confined to the enactment of
legislation that merely parrots the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment, but may prohibit a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that
which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text."); United States v.
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dies, legislative prophylaxis has been limited to statutes
that target a legal harm and regulate legal conduct that is
causally linked to the harm.32 Without a restriction on the
means and ends of prophylactic legislation, the congressional remedial power becomes a catchall power that usurps
the limits of the remedial power designated in Section 5.3"
That is, an unrestrained legislative remedial power poses
the same institutional concerns as unrestricted judicial
remedial power in that both threaten to reach beyond the
institutional actor's constitutional authority into the realm
of a separate branch of government."
After delineating the character and breadth of prophylaxis, this Article will then in Part II, explore the emerging
principles of law governing the appropriate use of judicial
discretion to select prophylactic relief.35 Two principles of
the appropriate use of equitable discretion to impose
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000) ("Section 5 is a positive grant of legislative
power that includes authority to prohibi[t] conduct which is not itself
unconstitutional and [to] intrud[e] into legislative spheres of autonomy
previously reserved to the States.") (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000) ("Congress' power
'to enforce' the Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to deter
violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader
swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the
Amendment's text."); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 ("Legislation which deters
or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress'
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself
unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously
reserved to the States.'") (citation omitted).
32. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619 ("However, as broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited.") (citations omitted); Kimel, 528 U.S. at
81 ("Nevertheless, we have also recognized that the same language that serves
as the basis for the affirmative grant of congressional power also serves to limit
that power.").
33. See Marci A. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of
Proportionality Analysis Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 469, 487 (1999) ("If Congress were permitted to enact rules
that it calls 'prophylactic' without any proportionality review, it could increase
its power under Section 5 geometrically."); Tracy A. Thomas, Congress' Section 5
Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673, 727 (2001) [hereinafter
Remedial Rights].
34. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalismand
Section Five Power: PolicentricInterpretation of the Family and Medical Leave
Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1945 (2003) (noting that "[tihe Rehnquist Court now
views Section 5 power as a potential threat to the Court's role as the ultimate
expositor of the constitutional text.") (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
35. See infra Part II.
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prophylactic relief emerge from the existing body of cases.
First, courts order prophylactic relief generally as a remedy
of last resort. 6 Defendants are given the first opportunity to
remedy the harm by action or remedial plan.3 Only where
prophylaxis is necessary because other remedies including
the defendant's own self-help have failed or are likely to fail
have courts selected the powerful prophylactic remedy from
among the arsenal of remedial weapons. Even then, courts
are careful to evaluate the necessity of directing each specific action to ensure that the restriction of legal conduct
does not unfairly trample upon defendants' legal rights or
institutional concerns. Second, courts are limited in selecting prophylactic relief by the evidence and arguments presented in the remedial process." The judge may not make
up the prophylactic remedy out of whole cloth, but instead
must solicit factual and legal inputs on the remedial question and then confine the remedial result to the established
record. While the judge is able to use problem solving skills
to creatively address complex legal problems, she may not
deviate from the established record in imposing relief.
Finally, Part III of this Article answers the theoretical
question of why prophylactic remedies are necessary, and
indeed integral, to remedying legal rights.39 The necessity of
prophylactic relief stems from both a theoretical and instrumental function. At the theoretical level, prophylactic measures are able to provide tangible meaning to otherwise
abstract rights by using its specificity to define those rights
by example." To define the color red, one might use examples of a tomato, blood, a cherry or a ruby to demonstrate
the meaning by specific illustration.4 1 So too, the prophylactic remedy illustrates the abstract meaning of legal rights
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
2000),

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.A.
See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed.
available at http://www.bartleby.com [hereinafter AMERICAN HERITAGE

DICTIONARY]; WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1900 (1986); Definition of "red," available at http://www.dictionary.

com (WordNet 1.6, Princeton University 1997) (last visited June 1, 2004). Compare these meaningful illustrative definitions with the explanatory definition of
red: "The hue of the long-wave end of the visible spectrum, evoked in the human
observer by radiant energy with wavelengths of approximately 630 to 750
nanometers." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra.
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and thereby promotes a tangible understanding of the contours of those rights. The specificity of prophylaxis also
fulfills a functional necessity of the court's enforcement of
legal rights. The specificity and regulation of affiliated conduct avoids the defendants' resistance to conforming to the
legal right, provides the defendants with clear notice of
what compliance is required, and facilitates the court's ability to monitor that compliance.4" Thus, the prophylactic
remedy occupies a unique position in the law providing the
courts with a powerful option to redress legal problems.
I. THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER OF PROPHYLACTIC RELIEF

The prophylactic remedy is as distinctive in character
as its name. The name, given to the remedy by the Supreme
Court, often evokes giggles from law students hearing of the
remedy for the first time.43 The common dictionary definition of the word means to "take precautions against" or "to
keep guard before."44 It is this notion of prevention that is at
the core of the legal definition of the term "prophylactic."
Black's Law Dictionary defines "prophylactic" as an adjective meaning "formulated to prevent something."45 This
definition mirrors the use of the term in medicine to
describe measures taken to prevent disease.46 For example,
prescriptive drugs may be given prophylactically to prevent
disease prior to exposure, or vaccines may be given to
prevent the contraction of disease.47 The U.S. Supreme
Court has used the term "prophylactic" to describe

42. See infra Part III.B.
43. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 41 (defining vernacular
meaning of the term prophylactic to mean a device to prevent an undesired
pregnancy), availableat http://www.bartleby.com.
44. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000), available at http:l/
www.bartleby.com; XII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 644 (2d ed. 1989).
45. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (7th ed. 1999) (giving the example of "a
prophylactic rule"). It is interesting to note that the definition of prophylactic
was not added to Black's until 1999.
46. DORLAND'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1364 (28th ed. 1994) (defining
"prophylactic" as "an agent that tends to ward off disease"); MERRIAMWEBSTER'S MEDICAL DESK DICTIONARY 579 (1993) (defining "prophylactic" as
"guarding from or preventing the spread or occurrence of disease or infection");
MOSBY'S DICTIONARY 1284 (4th ed. 1994) (defining "prophylaxis" as a biologic,
chemical, or mechanical agent that prevents the spread of disease).
47. See MOSBY'S DICTIONARY 1284 (4th ed. 1994); THE MERCK MANUAL OF
DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 2095-97 (17th ed. 1999).
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administrative rules,48 legislation,49 judicial remedies," and
private conduct.51 The commonality of the use of the adjective prophylactic in each of these contexts is to describe additional measures imposed to restrict legal conduct in order
to prevent future harm. The question, however, for this
prophylactic means in the judicial
Article, is what precisely
52
remedial context.
Prophylactic relief, as discussed below, is injunctive
relief that addresses defendants' conduct attendant to the
direct harm. The prophylactic remedy is seen in a variety of
substantive contexts, including constitutional rights,' sex48. E.g., Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 103 (2002)
(discussing administrative rules under FMLA as "prophylactic"); Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 307 (2001) (describing as "prophylactic" administrative
regulations that provide measures to eliminate workplace discrimination);
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 672-73 (1997) (upholding "prophylactic" securities regulation designed to prevent fraudulent trading); FTC v.
Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 393 (1959) (upholding the Commission's prophylactic remedy for violation of the Fur Labeling Act prohibiting the defendant's
misbranding on six different labels, even though the proven violations concerned only three types of labels).
49. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 152; Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 729
(2000) (describing Colorado statute aimed at preventing harm during abortion
protests).
50. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 382 (1997);
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 712 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
51. Prophylactic measures imposed by private individuals are the issue in
the First Amendment prophylaxis cases. In these cases, a defendant-imposed
ordinance or rule has categorically banned speech in order to avoid some perceived harm. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Ass'n, 538 U.S.
600 (2003) (discussing trilogy of cases of Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley, in
which defendants have prohibited solicitation and telemarketing to combat
fraud); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (prohibiting attorney solicitation). Such prophylaxis that is self-imposed by the defendant is often
struck down by the Court as an impermissible, overly broad restriction of First
Amendment rights. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S.781
(1988); Sec'y of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Schaumburg
v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). The mantra emerging from
these cases is that "[biroad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are
suspect. Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely
touching our most precious freedoms." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438
(1963).
52. For a discussion of prophylactic legislation, see infra text accompanying
notes 150-62 & 206-26; see also Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 33;
Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 33.
53. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (equal protection in vote
recount); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (school segregation); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. Of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (school segregation);
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (right to counsel); Miranda v. Arizona,
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ual harassment, 54 prison conditions,55 abortion rights,56 and
economic regulation. However, regardless of context,"
there are two definitive attributes of the prophylactic remedy: it is (1) injunctive relief with a preventive goal, (2) that
imposes specific measures reaching affiliated legal conduct
that contributes to the primary harm.
A. Prophylaxisas a Subset of Injunctive Relief
Prophylactic relief is a category of injunctive relief. Like
all injunctions, it is an order from the court to the defendant enjoining negative conduct or commanding affirmative
conduct.59 The conduct addressed in a prophylactic injunction, unlike other equitable relief, directs legal conduct that
is affiliated with, rather than the direct cause of or result
of, the harm. ° Prophylaxis encompasses this legal conduct
in order to take additional precautions against future harm.
384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right against self-incrimination and right to counsel);
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1965) (voting rights).
54. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Sims v.
Montgomery County, 766 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Ala. 1999); Neal v. Dir., D.C.
Dep't of Corrs., No. 93-2420, 1995 WL 517244 (D.D.C. 1995); Women Prisoners
v. D.C. Dep't of Corrs., 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994); Lynch v. City of Des
Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1990).
55. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (access to courts); Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (unconstitutional prison conditions); Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (access to courts); Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849
(parole board discrimination against disabled); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115
(5th Cir. 1982) (conditions); Women Prisoners v. D.C. Dep't of Corrs., 877 F.
Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994) (conditions, program equality, medical care).
56. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
57. E.g., SEC v. Capital Gains, 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (securities fraud); FTC
v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385 (1959) (deceptive fur labeling practices); FTC v.
Nat'l Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957) (antitrust price-fixing conspiracies); United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (antitrust monopoly),
vacated by 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
58. The substantive context of prophylactic relief might be described
generally as public law litigation. See Chayes, supra note 9, at 1284 (describing
public law litigation broadly to include cases of antitrust, fraud, corporate governance, desegregation, employment discrimination, prison reform, and environmental law).
59. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 162 (2d ed. 1993).
60. See, e.g., People Who Care v. Rockford Bd of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 533
(7th Cir. 1997) ("The discretionary power of a district court to formulate an
equitable remedy for an adjudicated violation of law is broad. Where necessary
for the elimination of the violation, the decree can properly fence the defendant
in by forbidding conduct not unlawful in itself.").
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Thus, in order to prevent continuing or recurring harm, the
court will address affiliated conduct that contributes to the
harm in order to avert future wrongs. 61 For example, to
prevent future sexual harassment caused by a hostile environment, the court might order the defendant company to
enact anti-harassment policies, train employees on the
meaning and law of sexual harassment, or adopt investigative and complaint procedures. Or in an economic regulation case, the court might prevent future harms by appointing an oversight board to monitor the defendant corporation's ongoing business. 62 The two key attributes of prophylactic relief, then, are its preventive goal and its enjoining
of legal conduct. The prophylactic injunction, like all injunctions, is enforced by the contempt power that subjects the
defendant to fines or imprisonment for failing to obey the
court's order.63 In this way, the prophylactic measures
convert permissible conduct into illegal conduct for that
particular defendant. 4
The existing analytical framework of injunctive relief
omits prophylaxis from its classification. The modern textbook description of the types of injunctive relief identifies
three types: preventive, reparative, and structural. 65 A preventive injunction is a simple injunction that prevents

61. SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 1, at 246 ("A prophylactic injunction seeks to
safeguard the plaintiffs rights by directing the defendant's behavior so as to
minimize the chance that wrongs might recur in the future."); cf. Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977) (describing antitrust
merger law as a "prophylactic measure, intended 'primarily to arrest apprehended consequences of intercorporate relationships before those relationships
could work their evil'") (citations omitted).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C.
2002) (approving settlement that created a bipartisan technical committee and
an internal compliance officer to monitor future business activities); see also
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232, 2002 WL 31654530 (D.D.C. Nov.
12, 2002); Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (appointing an "Internal
Antitrust Compliance Committee" consisting of a board and a chief compliance
officer to oversee defendant corporation's future compliance with the antitrust
laws).
63. DOBBS, supra note 59, at 130.
64. See SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 1, at 246 ("Violation of a prophylactic
injunction is not necessarily a legal wrong in itself, except that the injunction
makes it so.").
65. DOBBS, supra note 59, at 164; LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 233. Professor
Owen Fiss first coined the analytical terms "reparative" and "structural" relief
to describe the orders issued in public law litigation. OWEN M. FIss, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS INJUNCTION 7 (1978).
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future harm by ordering the defendant to stop the illegal
conduct.66 A reparative injunction repairs past harm by correcting the existing effects and consequences of that harm."
A structural injunction alters the organizational structure,
66. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 59, at 164 ("A preventive injunction attempts to prevent the loss of an entitlement in the future."); FISS, supra note 65,
at 7-8 (describing the preventive injunction as a decree "Which seeks to prohibit
some discrete act or series of acts from occurring in the future" and comparing it
to an individuated "mini-criminal statute"); SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 1, at
246 ("The preventive injunction.., has roots deep in the common law. Its
purpose is to prevent the defendant from inflicting future injury on the
plaintiff."). For example, a defendant found to have racially discriminated by
segregating schools would be ordered to stop discriminating, or provide a unitary racial school system. E.g., United States v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 977 F.
Supp. 1202, 1211 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ("'Defendants... are enjoined from discriminating against black students attending the public schools in Defendant district
on the basis of race and are required to take further action, as described herein,
to disestablish the dual system of schools based upon race.") (citations omitted).
In another example from the Microsoft antitrust case, the company found to
have violated the law prohibiting monopolies was ordered in essence to "stop
violating the antitrust laws by maintaining its operating system monopoly
through its browser." Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 68; see also Microsoft,
2002 WL 31654530, at *2 (prohibiting company from restricting manufacturer
or end user ability to alter browser function).
67. See DOBBS, supra note 59, at 164 ("The reparative injunction requires
the defendant to restore the plaintiff to a preexisting entitlement."); FISS, supra
note 65, at 7-8 (describing the reparative injunction as a decree "which compels
the defendant to engage in a course of action that seeks to correct the effects of
a past wrong" and analogizing it to an in-kind damage award); LAYCOCK, supra
note 4, at 269 ('The distinction between preventive and reparative injunctions
is between preventing the wrongful act... and preventing some or all of the
harmful consequences of that act."); see also SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 1, at
246 (using the label "restorative" to define an injunction that "principally
operates to correct the present by undoing the effects of a past wrong. The
notion of 'restoring' means that it focuses not only prospectively, as does the
traditional preventive injunction, but also retroactively."). In the school desegregation example, the defendant school might be ordered in reparative relief to
redress the deficiencies in education by adopting remedial education programs
to bolster student learning. In the Microsoft monopoly example, reparative
relief might order the defendant to correct the consequences of its monopoly by
requiring the licensing of previously denied software and providing the
functional ability to allow users to disconnect the Microsoft browser and use
that of the competitor. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 667-68; Microsoft,
2002 WL 31654530, at *3 (ordering the disclosure of concealed computer codes);
see also Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967) (ordering a reparative
injunction to remedy the racial discrimination during an election by setting
aside the election and ordering a new special election); Vasquez v. Bannworths,
Inc., 707 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. 1986) (ordering a reparative injunction requiring
defendant to rehire employee wrongfully discharged because of her union
affiliation).
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rather than behavioral aspects, of an illegal institution.68
Prophylactic relief, if identified at all, has been subsumed
within either reparative6 9 or structural injunctions.7 " This
68. FISS, supra note 65, at 7 (describing the structural injunction, "which
seeks to effectuate the reorganization of an ongoing social institution"); Justice,
supra note 9, at 2 ("The structural suit is one in which a judge, confronting a
state bureaucracy over values of constitutional dimension, undertakes to restructure the organization to eliminate a threat to those values posed by the
present institutional arrangements."). In the school desegregation example, the
school organization itself is ordered to alter its dual racial structure and adopt a
unitary racial system rather than simply stopping its discriminatory behavior.
FISS, supra note 65, at 9; Justice, supra note 9, at 2-3. Structural relief in the
Microsoft monopoly case would have restructured the company into two
companies, one for the Windows operating system and one for the remaining
software products. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
69. See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 4; SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 1, at 246
(categorizing together restorative and prophylactic injunctions). This theory
conceptualizes prophylaxis as any broad injunctive relief that reaches wide to
redress the harm. LAYCOCK, supra note 4 (explaining case of overbroad injunctive scope as prophylactic); SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 37, 131 (defining
prophylactic relief as any relief which gives the plaintiff more than its rightful
position). For example, injunctions that reach broadly across geographic districts or company locations have been categorized as prophylactic. See, e.g.,
LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 283 (exemplifying prophylactic relief by case of
Mantek Division v. Share Corp., 780 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1986), where an
injunction was issued by the trial court prohibiting former employees from selling competitor's goods anywhere in their former sales territory); SCHOENBROD,
supra note 4, at 179 (characterizing as prophylactic the injunction in Sterling
Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 1994), barring use of "Bayer" name
in the United States and in all foreign publications likely to cause confusion to
U.S. consumers). In addition, blanket prohibitions of conduct resulting from a
breach have also been classified as prophylactic. See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note
4, at 285 (classifying as prophylactic the injunction in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond,
54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995), prohibiting former employee from ever working for
rival because of likelihood that trade secrets would be revealed and classifying
order in Maritrans GP, Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277 (Pa.
1992), prohibiting law firm from representing competitors of a former client
from which it had received confidential information of value to competitors);
SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 131 (describing as prophylactic relief the injunction in Paramount Pictures v. Davis, 228 Cal. App.2d 827 (1964), prohibiting
Bette Davis from working for any studio until she completed her role for Paramount as contracted); SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 164 (classifying as
prophylactic the injunction in PepsiCo prohibiting former employee from ever
working for a rival because of the likelihood that trade secrets would be
revealed). This remedial classification based on the categorical prohibition of
conduct likely stems from the judicial use of the term in the First Amendment
context to describe municipal and organizational rules that broadly prohibit all
speech. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. However, these blanket
prohibitions imposed by the defendants are prophylactic not because of the
absolution of their ban on conduct, but rather due to the preventive goal of the
defendant entity which initially enacted the ban to avoid future illegal conduct.
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categorization, however, incorrectly depicts the prophylactic
injunction and fails to recognize its distinct goal and measures that differentiate it from the other categories.71 An accurate classification and recognition of prophylactic relief is
important to understand the available remedial options and
to counter the accusations of prophylaxis' illegitimacy,
which are founded in large part upon a misconception of the
parameters of this remedy.
In my view, a more accurate classification of injunctive
relief would identify the three core types of injunctions as
(1) preventive, (2) reparative, and (3) prophylactic. Structural relief would be reserved as a label for a hybrid
These injunctions are simply reparative injunctions rectifying the consequences
of the harm by relief that is broad in scope, not prophylactic in character. The
analytical problem with characterizing prophylactic relief as any overbroad
relief is that it feeds into the critic's argument that prophylactic relief is simply
a blanket license to use equity to overreach. Moreover, the reparative characterization of prophylaxis is fundamentally flawed because the reparative relief
focuses on the post-deprivation time period. Prophylactic relief, to the contrary,
addresses conduct preceding a threatened harm in order to prevent that harm;
it does not reach out to correct the consequences of that harm.
70. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 59, at 643 (describing orders requiring
notice of employee rights or instituting a grievance system as a type of
structural injunction that is "simple in comparison" to usual structural
injunctions); FISS, supra note 65, at 13; LAYCOCK, supra note 4; Chayes, supra
note 9, at 1281; Landsberg, supra note 2, at 936 (recognizing that
"[pirophylactic commands became a central feature of what some came to call
the structural injunction"). The construct of structural relief as an all-encompassing public law remedy might explain how prophylactic relief has at times
been subsumed within structural relief. Owen Fiss, in first describing the
contours of his new remedial category of "structural relief," described structural
relief as an injunction aimed at transforming the nature of the institution itself
to conform to constitutional values. FISS, supra note 65, at 13. The distinguishing characteristics of the structural injunction were, according to Fiss, its goal
of institutional reform, its alteration of institutional structure rather than
behavior, its complexity, its impact upon societal groups, and its establishment
of an ongoing relationship between the court and the defendant. Id. As an aside,
Fiss noted that courts might sometimes accomplish structural change by the
use of specific orders giving the defendants precise, practical steps to follow. Id.
Similarly, Professor Dobbs in his classic remedies treatise acknowledged the
existence of a simpler, more specific type of injunctive measure contained
within some structural relief. DOBBS, supra note 59, at 643.
71. If anything, prophylactic relief is a subset of preventive relief providing
a more complex order to prevent future harm. See Landsberg, supra note 2, at
926-27 n.6 (stating that prophylactic "measures have also been called 'preventive remedial,' but that phrase seems too limited because it sounds like ordinary
preventive relief, aimed directly at the core violation than at risk") (citations
omitted); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999).
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injunction combining any or all of the three core injunctions
and focused on structural rather than behavioral change.72
The three core types of injunctive relief are available in
every case to address the legal wrong at each phase of the
harm continuum. Preventive relief addresses the core harm
by ordering the cessation of illegal activity. Reparative relief addresses the subsequent consequences of that harm by
redressing the resulting effects of the illegal act. Prophylactic relief focuses on the pre-harm time period in order to
direct conduct that has a tendency to contribute to or facilitate the primary harm (Diagram A).
Diagram A
Prophylactic
Facilitators -Preventive
HARM ------CAUSE ----Facilitators

Reparative
CONSEQUENCES

--

This triumvirate of equitable relief allows the courts to
redress harms more comprehensively and holistically. The
court is able to treat the whole legal problem of contributor,
cause, and effect rather than ineffectively applying remedial band-aids to the direct wound.
Diverging from the existing classification model, it is
also possible to understand the different types of injunctive
relief as alternative adjectives used to describe the equitable relief imposed by the court. It might be useful to think
in terms of different labels for these remedies, perhaps
substituting the descriptions of short, tall, wide, and round
(Diagram B). A preventive injunction is short relief because
it is a simple, minimalist order that requires the defendant
to stop the harm. A reparative injunction is tall relief
because it stretches tall to reach the continuing consequences of the past harm. A prophylactic injunction is wide
in that it sweeps out wide to bring in affiliated legal
conduct in order to prevent future harm. Prophylactic is not
a third category of height, but rather provides an alternative description of relief by honing in on the most important
characteristic-the width or breath of the relief. Structural

72. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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relief can be described as round because it extends all
around to encompass the short, tall, and wide aspects of relief by using all means to alter the structure of the institution.
Diagram B
R

S
T
R
U

0

C
T
U
R
A
L

PREVENTIVE

ez ff
P R O

Structural relief
separate category of
commonly is ordered
lief.7 3 The important

P H Y LACTICj

emerges as a hybrid rather than a
injunctive relief. For structural relief
as both preventive and reparative recharacteristic of structural relief as

73. E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (ordering structural
change in single sex military institution to both prevent and correct discrimination); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2000)
(ordering structural injunction of divestiture as preventive relief to stop the
continuation of the monopoly), vacated by 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); DOBBS,
supra note 59, at 164 (stating that structural injunctions "would be simple reparative or preventive injunctions if they merely ordered authorities to carry
out or to cease some specific act" rather than restructuring an institution); FISS,
supra note 65, at 13 (describing structural relief as complex series of preventive
and reparative injunctions distinguished by its alteration of the structure of the
defendant's institution).
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compared with the other categories is its alteration of the
very structure of an institution as opposed to the behavior
of the institutional actors.74 Defined analytically, structural
relief is a rarely occurring type of remedy. 5 Structural relief
should be distinguished from the theory of remedial process
that accompanied its original conceptualization. Both Professors Chayes and Fiss initially advocated for the structural injunction as part of a remedial process for public law
rights that differed from private law. They envisioned an
ongoing remedial process directed by an activist judge that
focused on the transformation of a social condition affecting
a social group rather than correcting an incident of wrongdoing against individual plaintiffs.77 This theory of remedial
activism drew substantial criticism over the years, leading
to a suspicion of structural relief and public law remedies in
general.8 However, time has shown that judges generally
do not act in this activist fashion, but rather, impose public
law remedies using the same adjudicatory process as in
private law cases. Thus, the structural injunction construct should be extricated from its associated context of judicial activism, and recognized as one of the four possible
types of injunctive relief in any given case."

74. See Justice, supra note 9, at 7-9; Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in
Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2001) (addressing the economic realities of a structural injunction ordering divestiture of Microsoft); Microsoft Corp.,
97 F. Supp. 2d at 61 (indicating that the court was considering injunctive relief
that would mandate both conduct modification and structural reorganization).
75. FISS, supra note 65, at 8 (arguing that the structural injunction emerges
from among the other types of injunctions as "a truly unique legal instrument");
Justice, supra note 9, at 17 ("[S]tructural reform surely is a transformation; it
looks breathtakingly different.").
76. See Chayes, supra note 9, at 1281; Justice,supra note 9, at 18-28.
77. See Justice,supra note 9, at 18-28.
78. DOBBS, supra note 59, at 645 (describing the skepticism with which
structural injunctions are viewed); see, e.g., Yoo, supra note 7, at 1123; Paul J.
Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949
(1978).
79. See infra Part II.B; Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial
Decisionmaking: School Desegregation and District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L.
REV. 1623, 1627 (2003) (conducting a study of school desegregation remedies
from 1992 to 2002 and concluding that judges do not behave in atypical, activist
ways in imposing public law remedies, but rather follow a process common to
most private litigation).
80. See FISS, supra note 65, at 9-10 (noting that the antecedents to the
desegregation structural injunction could be found in the railroad monopoly
cases of the turn of the century and the modem antitrust divestiture cases).

322

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

Ultimately, the utility of the four labels characterizing
injunctive relief lies in their ability to analytically describe
the relief ordered by courts. The categories reinforce that
the exercise of remedial equity is not the random use of
each judge's individual views and biases, but rather, is a
constrained authority to impose one of four types of permissible measures when injunctive relief is requested and
necessary. Perhaps more importantly, the injunctive categories assist lawyers and courts in initially crafting equitable
relief in a given case. The parties can think through each
category of injunctive relief as they routinely do with damages (i.e., general, consequential, incidental, pecuniary, and
non-pecuniary damages) to conceptualize what type of relief
may be appropriate in their case. The categories thus circumscribe the arguments in equity and provide the courts
and lawyers with a common language in discussing equitable relief. Thus, the starting point for understanding prophylactic relief is recognizing it as a distinct subset of injunctive relief designed ultimately to prevent future harm.81
B. The Specific Measures DirectingAffiliated Legal Conduct
The hallmark of prophylactic relief, distinguishing it
from other injunctive remedies, is its specificity in directing
legal conduct affiliated with, but not causing, the legal
harm. Prophylaxis encompasses "affiliated conduct," that is,
secondary conduct that is causally linked with the direct
harm, but which itself does not violate the law.82 For example, in the sexual harassment context, the harassment of
the employee by an individual is the primary cause of the
harm that violates law. Yet, affiliated conduct, such as the
company culture, the corporate policies, and the corporate
response, may all contribute to that harassment even
though the lack of a policy or training itself does not violate
the law. These contributors of harm may be addressed by
the court in a prophylactic order when necessary to redress

81. See Thomas, ProphylacticRemedies, supra note 1, at 366-74 (disagreeing
with the academic conceptualization of prophylaxis as a judicial "rule" and
explaining the remedial character of prophylaxis).
82. Cf United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 672-73 (1997) ("A
prophylactic measure, because its mission is to prevent, typically encompasses
more than the core activity prohibited.").
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a legal violation.83 Prophylactic relief is therefore distinguished from among the other injunctive remedies by its
inclusion of specific safeguards or measures adding to relief
prohibiting or correcting the primary legal harm.
The ability of this remedy to use specificity and precision to hone in on affiliated conduct is what makes this
remedy effective at redressing the whole of the legal problem.84 Other remedies are often inadequate to provide the
necessary holistic solution to a complex legal problem.85 The
concept of holistic treatment derived from medicine refers
to the treatment of the patient's diet, environment, and
psychological being in addition to the medical treatment of
the primary disease.86 The holistic theory is that to prevent
83. E.g., Women Prisoners v. D.C. Dep't of Corrs., 877 F. Supp. 634, 679-81
(D.D.C. 1994), overruled in part, 93 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (overturning
appointment of special officer to monitor and investigate sexual harassment
complaints).
84. See Justice, supra note 9, at 47-49; Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 675;
infra Part III.A.
85. Chayes, supra note 9, at 1295 (stating that simple prohibitory orders
such as "stop denying treatment to mental patient" are inadequate to provide
meaningful relief in public law litigation). See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 2.1 & cmt. 2 (2002) (indicating that lawyers should address moral, economic,
social and political considerations to provide meaningful advice to the client).
86. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 41 (defining holistic
medicine as "an approach to medical care that emphasizes the study of all
aspects of a person's health, including physical, psychological, social, economic,
and cultural factors"), available at http://www.bartleby.com. The American
Holistic Health Association defines "holistic" health in the following way:
Holistic health is actually an approach to life. Rather than focusing on
illness or specific parts of the body, this ancient approach to health
considers the whole person and how he or she interacts with his or her
environment. It emphasizes the connection of mind, body, and spirit.
The goal is to achieve maximum well-being, where everything is
functioning the very best that is possible. With Holistic Health people
accept responsibility for their own level of well-being, and everyday
choices are used to take charge of one's own health.
SUZAN WALTER,

THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BODY-MIND DISCIPLINES

(1999), available at http://www.ahha.orgfrosen.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
See also www.holisticmed.com/whatis.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2004) ("Holistic
medicine is a system of health care which fosters a cooperative relationship
among all those involved, leading towards optimal attainment of the physical,
mental emotional, social and spiritual aspects of health. It emphasizes the need
to look at the whole person, including analysis of physical, nutritional, environmental, emotional, social, spiritual and lifestyle values."); Michael H. Cohen, A
Fixed Star in Health Care Reform: The Emerging Paradigmof Holistic Healing,
27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 79, 88 (1995) ("Holistic healing refers to a paradigm of health
care that 'recognize [s] the importance of considering the condition of the patient
as well as the disease and advances the theory that the psyche and the soma,
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or cure a powerful disease, healthcare practitioners must
address all factors that contribute to the patient's health.87
Similarly, prophylactic relief allows the courts to address
all of the factors contributing to the legal "disease" in order
to prevent a powerful problem of public import. Indeed, the
types of harms seen in cases of prophylaxis tend to be
among the most severe in civil law. These cases involve
egregious harms that threaten personal integrity, personal
liberty,88 or rights otherwise prioritized in the law.89 Thus,
prophylactic relief is necessary, and even integral, to
effective judicial response to existing complex problems.
The holistic solution provided by prophylactic relief
may, like any injunction, be affirmative or prohibitive in
nature." An affirmative prophylactic remedy would require
affirmative steps to prevent harm, while a prohibitive prophylactic remedy would enjoin the negative facilitators that
tend to contribute to harm. The types of negative facilitators addressed by the court through prophylactic measures
are varied depending upon the factual causes of the harm in
a given case. Perhaps the most-well-known example of a
prophylactic remedy prohibiting a facilitator of legal harm
is the prison case of Hutto v. Finney." In Hutto, the
the mind and the body, are one.' In holistic healing, 'all parts of the systembody, mind, spirit, environment, society-are interrelated and interact to produce health or disease; illness reflects an imbalance between the individual and
the wider world.'") (citations omitted).
87. See generally WILLIAM COLLINGE, M.P.H., PH.D., THE AMERICAN HOLISTIC
HEALTH ASSOCIATION COMPLETE GUIDE TO ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE (1996); JAMES
S. GORDON, HOLISTIC MEDICINE (1988).
88. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 49 (2002) ("For instance, in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966), we found that an environment of police
custodial interrogation was coercive enough to require prophylactic warnings
only after observing that such an environment exerts a 'heavy toll on individual
liberty.' But we have not required Miranda warnings during noncustodial police
questioning.").
89. See PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed.,
1993); Levinson, supra note 71; SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 94 ("Courts
generally place a higher value on constitutional, statutory, and common law
property rights than they do on enforcement of commercial promises . . ").
90. See DOBBS, supra note 59, at 163-64 (discussing mandatory and prohibitory injunctions); LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 264 (explaining that injunctions
can both forbid conduct and require action).
91. E.g., United States v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 977 F. Supp. 1202 (S.D.
Fla. 1997) (ordering that future school construction and site selection be done in
a manner that prevents the recurrence of the dual racial school structure).
92. 437 U.S. 678 (1978). Justice Rehnquist's dissent pejoratively labeled the
injunction as a "prophylactic rule." He disagreed with the majority's conclusion
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Supreme Court upheld an injunction limiting punitive isolation to a maximum of thirty days even though the practice
itself was found not to violate the Eighth Amendment.93 The
Court upheld the restriction on punitive isolation because it
was one factor facilitating the unconstitutional conditions of
overcrowding and rampant violence.94
Other examples of prophylaxis banning negative facilitators can be seen in the abortion protest cases of Madsen v.
Women's Health Center, Inc.,9" and Schenck v. Pro-Choice
Network.96 In Madsen and Schenck, a key facilitator of the
legal harm was the proximity of the protestors and the
clients and employees of the abortion clinic.97 The prophylactic relief addressed the negative facilitator of the proximity by imposing a buffer zone around the clinic that the
protestors were prohibited from entering.9" In addition, the
Schenck Court addressed the proximity problem of protestors approaching individuals by requiring protestors to
"cease and desist" and move away from an individual if she
did not want to hear the message being conveyed.99
that the period of time in punitive isolation related to the condition found offensive to the Constitution, and thus simply differed from the majority as to
whether the isolation was in fact a facilitator of the legal harm. See id. at 712.
93. Id. Confinement in punitive isolation was for an indeterminate period of
time during which an average of four and sometimes as many as eleven
prisoners were crowded into windowless 8' x 10' cells containing no furniture
other than a water source and a toilet where they were given fewer than 1000
calories a day and fed "grue," a substance created by mashing meat, potatoes,
oleo, syrup, vegetables, eggs, and seasoning into a paste and baking the mixture
in a pan. Id. at 682-83.
94. Id. at 684 (finding that punitive isolation is one of the interdependent
conditions that can lead to overcrowded cells, vandalized cells, rampant violence, and inadequate diet).
95. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
96. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
97. 512 U.S. at 755; 519 U.S. at 359.
98. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 380 (affirming an injunction prohibiting demonstrations within 15 feet of the entrance to the abortion clinic); Madsen, 512
U.S. at 753 (affirming in part an injunction ordering protestors to stay off
clinic's property and to stay off public property within 36 feet of the clinic's
property line).
99. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 357, 383-84 (affirming injunction permitting two
sidewalk counselors within the 15-foot zone but requiring them to cease and
desist from talking to any person who asked them to leave); see also Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707-08 (2000) (upholding COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122,
making it unlawful for any person to knowingly approach another person
within eight feet for the purpose of protesting when that person is within a
radius of 100 feet from any entrance door to a health care facility).
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This remedial principle is also found in the private context of unfair competition. The Court in Federal Trade
Commission v. National Lead Co., prohibited the negative
facilitator of "zone-delivered pricing," which was a system
by which the defendant sellers set the same delivered price
for all customers in a particular geographic zone. °° The
Court prohibited competitors from using similar zone-delivered pricing because that system resulted in an anticompetitive conspiracy in the given case and was found by the
court to facilitate illegal price fixing in general among the
defendant companies. Thus, courts use prophylactic relief
to ban conduct that is likely to contribute to future harm of
the type demonstrated in the case.
Prophylactic relief is also imposed to require defendants
to take affirmative measures that will protect against the
occurrence of future harm. 10 2 These prophylactic measures
mandating affirmative facilitators of prevention are either
case specific or process oriented. As with prophylaxis involving negative facilitators, relief addressing affirmative
facilitators will conform its measures to the contributing
realities demonstrated by the case.' 3 For example, in the
desegregation case of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
County, the evidence and argument at trial demonstrated
that racial segregation in the schools was caused by the
primary conduct of the school's assignment policy, and facilitated by the realities of segregation in housing and
economic segregation. The prophylactic measures adopted
by the Swann Court of busing, gerrymandered attendance
zones, and quotas were aimed at preventing future school
segregation by addressing the contributing cause of the
housing segregation.

100. 352 U.S. 419, 430 (1957) ("[Dlecrees often suppress a lawful device
when it is used to carry out an unlawful purpose. In such instances the Court is
obliged not only to suppress the unlawful practice but to take such reasonable
action as is calculated to preclude the revival of the illegal practice.").
101. Id. at 426 (limiting the use of zone-delivered pricing because the
practice readily lent itself to price fixing and the history of its unlawful use was
pervasive in the industry).
102. E.g., Women Prisoners v. D.C. Dep't of Corrs., 877 F. Supp. 634, 679
(D.D.C. 1994).
103. E.g., id. at 679-90 (requiring affirmative steps with respect to sexual
harassment, obstetrical and gynecological care, educational programs, and fire
and environmental safety as dictated by the evidence).
104. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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In addition, the cases of prophylactic relief addressing
affirmative facilitators commonly impose process-oriented
measures to protect against the threatened harm. Regardless of the substantive context of the case, prophylactic
measures often require procedural safeguards such as
institutional policies, procedures, training, notice, or monitoring. Prophylactic cases routinely require defendants to
develop new policies, such as an anti-harassment policy or a
race-neutral assignment policy. °5 These policy remedies are
designed to address the problem from the top-down by
instituting internal mechanisms that establish organizational cultures designed to avoid harm and that allow the
defendant to self-regulate against future harm independent
of the court. Courts also impose procedures upon defendants through prophylactic relief to provide them with a
series of tangible steps to follow to avoid a recurrence of
harm. 6 Examples of prophylactic procedures imposed by
the courts include the complaint and grievance processes
mandated in sexual harassment cases, 07 the vote recount
process mandated in Bush v. Gore,'°8 and the parole procedures required to avoid future discrimination against
parolees.' Employees of the defendant organizations then
may also be ordered by prophylactic relief to undergo train105. E.g., id. at 679, 680 ("Within 60 days, the Defendants shall write and
follow a Department Order prohibiting sexual harassment involving District of
Columbia Department of Corrections ("DCDC") employees and women
prisoners ....
Under this policy the DCDC has the obligation to take
appropriate steps to prevent and remedy sexual harassment committed by its
own employees ....
Prohibited conduct under the policy shall be defined
as .... ")
106. See supra text accompanying notes 103-104; infra text accompanying
notes 106-07; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725-26 (1969) (mandating
process to avoid harsher sentence on resentencing after successful appeal);
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (adopting procedure governing.
withdrawal of counsel to protect defendant's right to counsel).
107. E.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Perhaps
the most important part of the preventive remedy will be a prompt and effective
procedure for hearing, adjudicating, and remedying complaints of sexual harassment within the agency. The Director should promptly take all necessary
steps to investigate and correct any harassment, including warnings and appropriate discipline directed at the offending party, and should generally develop
other means of preventing harassment within the agency."). Process can be as
simple as a hotline to report sexual harassment, or complex system for reporting, investigating, and sanctioning sexual harassment. See Women Prisoners,
877 F. Supp. at 680-81.
108. 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam).
109. Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001).
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ing on the new policy" ° to ensure the proper implementation of the processes.
The fourth common prophylactic measure of a procedural nature requires notice to the plaintiff or disclosure by
the defendant. Prophylactic remedies mandating notice are
designed to prevent future violations of rights by addressing the significant causal contributor of the plaintiffs own
lack of knowledge."1 For example, in the sexual harassment
cases, defendant companies notify employees of relevant
policies or procedures by posting notices on bulletin boards
or circulating letters.'
In the case of Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc.,"' the Supreme Court required an investment adviser
who violated the securities fraud law to disclose his own
personal securities dealings to future clients when he advised them to make the same investments." 4 This notice
110. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 947 (ordering the director of the agency "to raise
affirmatively the subject of sexual harassment with all his employees and
inform all employees that sexual harassment violates Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Guidelines of the EEOC, the express orders of the Mayor
of the District of Columbia, and the policy of the agency itself'); id. at 948 n.15
(ordering the director of the agency "to develop other appropriate means of
instructing employees of the Department of the harmful nature of sexual
harassment" and to train employees on how to report sexual harassment and
file grievances to enforce their rights); Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 681
(ordering training conducted by an industry expert and containing certain
mandatory information regarding the policies and processes for sexual harassment). In voting cases, courts have ordered the training of personnel involved in
recounts to ensure the proper implementation of recount policy. See Bush, 531
U.S. at 109 (noting additional concerns with Florida Supreme Court injunction
which failed to specify who would recount ballots and forced county canvassing
boards to pull together "ad hoc teams of judges" with "no previous training in
handling and interpreting ballots").
111. E.g., Women Prisoners,877 F. Supp. at 682 ("Defendants shall inform
all women prisoners of the procedure to access health services while incarcerated.").
112. E.g., Bundy, 641 F.2d 934, 948 n.15 (ordering defendants to "notify all
employees and supervisors in the Department through individual letters and
permanent posting in prominent locations throughout Department offices, that
sexual harassment" violates the law and departmental policy); Women
Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 679 ("The Defendants shall post and circulate the
Department Order in accordance with departmental policy."); see also United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 69 (D.D.C. 2000) (requiring
defendant to provide notice to employees of the final judgment and injunction in
the antitrust case accompanied by an explanation of that ruling to defendant's
employees), vacated by 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
113. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
114. Id. at 181-82.
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was important to providing the investment clients with the
knowledge needed to avoid potential harm."5 And the infamous case of prophylaxis, Miranda, and its required warnings of a suspect's constitutional rights, show that prophylactic remedies are often imposed to ensure that the potential victim has sufficient knowledge of his rights under the
law.' 16 For knowledge is power-and that power enables the
plaintiff herself to prevent the harm."7
The last, but perhaps most common, prophylactic measure imposing process-related affirmative measures upon the
defendant requires monitoring of the defendant by the court
or third party."8 In an early case of prophylaxis, the
Supreme Court in Louisiana v. United States imposed reporting requirements to ensure that the defendant's future
actions did not cause repeated race discrimination in
voting."' In prison condition litigation, courts routinely
order the defendants to submit reports to the plaintiffs or
the court documenting compliance with the ordered relief.12 °
Courts may also appoint third parties to oversee the implementation of the ordered change or monitor future compliance with the law.' 2 ' And in the Microsoft antitrust case, in
115. Id.
116. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
117. The phrase is attributed to Francis Bacon (1561-1621), a philosopher,
writer, and scientist: "Knowledge is power. The more one knows, the more one
will be able to control events." THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY 52
(E.D. Hirsch Jr. et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002); see also Proverbs 24:5 ("A wise man is
strong; yea, a man of knowledge increaseth strength.").
118. LAYCOCK, supra nqte 4, at 285 ("Another common prophylactic
provision is [the] monitoringtof defendant's compliance with the injunction.");
United States v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 977 F. Supp. 1202, 1227 (S.D. Fla.
1997) (explaining an earlier-,order that required defendants "to file with the
Court and provide to the parties annual reports containing a variety of information on the operation of the school system").
119. 380 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1965) (upholding prophylactic decree: "It also was
certainly an appropriate exercise of the District Court's discretion to order
reports to be made every month concerning the registration of voters in these 21
parishes, in order that the court might be informed as to whether the old
discriminatory practices really had been abandoned in good faith.").
120. E.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 683 (1978) (describing district
court's initial order providing the prison defendants with the first opportunity
to remedy the proven harm, but requiring defendants to file reports on its
progress); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1143, 1143 n.126 (5th Cir. 1982)
(upholding district court requirement that defendant file reports on the number
of inmates and space per inmate).
121. E.g., Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 977 F. Supp. at 1227 (explaining an
earlier order in a school desegregation case that established a bi-racial commit-

330

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

order to monitor the defendant corporation's future business practices, the district court initially created an internal compliance committee and authorized the inspection of
the company's books and accounts upon request by
plaintiff.
Thus, the key distinguishing characteristic of all prophylactic relief is its ability to address the contributing
causes or facilitators of harm through specific measures.
While this ability to reach related legal conduct is broad, it
is not unlimited. For, as discussed below, the courts have
restricted the use of the prophylactic remedy by permitting
it to address only those facilitators that are causally linked
to the proven harm.
C. The Limited Reach of ProphylacticRelief
Prophylaxis then is properly described as relief that
"sweeps broadly to include legal conduct."123
' This
breadth is
the core of the effectiveness of the prophylactic remedy, but
it has also served as the lightning rod for attacks on
prophylaxis.124 Critics argue that the remedy is overbroad in
tee to be charged with "responsibility for discussing ways and means of
achieving racial harmony and understanding among the students, teachers and
parents and shall function as an advisory body to the school board"); cf., United
States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 823 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding district court's
grant of injunctive relief requiring defendant to seek advance approval from the
Corps of Engineers prior to any dredging or filling operations where the
defendant had drained swamps without the required wetlands permit and lied
to the Corps about his operations).
122. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 69-70 (D.D.C.
2000), vacated by 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
No. 98-1232, 2002 WL 31654530 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2002) (ordering creation of
technical committee to monitor future business actions, hiring of internal compliance officer by defendant corporation, and authorizing access and inspection
by plaintiffs).
123. Strauss, supra note 22, at 959 (explaining that "in principle, Miranda
is no different from any number of well-established rules of constitutional law
that also, in a sense, 'sweep[] more broadly than the [Constitution] itself")
(quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985); Thomas, Remedial Rights,
supra note 33, at 707, 727; cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997)
("Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations, can fall within
the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits
conduct which is not itself unconstitutional . . ").
124. See Yoo, supra note 7, at 1126-29; cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 775
(2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (dissenting from affirmation of prophylactic
legislative measure: "Overbreadth is a constitutional flaw, not a saving feature.").
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that it inappropriately "overprotects" plaintiff by giving her
more than the operative right requires."' The standard rule
of injunctive relief is that the scope of the remedy must be
confined by the scope of the harm in order to restrain the
judge from exceeding his power to decide judicial cases.'26
The overbroad prophylactic remedy seemingly fails to conform to this tailoring requirement, and thus, it has been
argued that prophylaxis constitutes judicial overreaching
by judges who impose their own view of justice not dictated
by the right itself. 27
These criticisms of the illegitimacy of prophylactic relief, however, are based on an inaccurate assumption that
the use of prophylactic relief is unconstrained by any limiting principles. 28 To the contrary, the breadth of prophylaxis
is not haphazard or subject merely to the whim of the
125. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 801-810 110
Stat. 1321 1321-66 to -77 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and
42 U.S.C.) (reacting to the perception of prophylactic injunctions as overprotecting prisoners' rights by limiting injunctive relief in prisoner cases arising out of
conditions of confinement to the minimum necessary to correct the legal violation); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 209 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Like all prophylactic rules, the Miranda rule 'overprotects' the value at
stake."); Paul G. Cassell, The PathsNot Taken: The Supreme Court'sFailuresin
Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REv. 898, 905 (2001) (arguing that Miranda's automatic
rule "overprotects" a constitutional right: "Overprotection means protection
beyond what the Constitution requires."); Klein, supra note 22, at 1033 (describing prophylactic rules as those that overprotect constitutional rights);
Landsberg, supra note 2, at 969; Thomas G. Saylor, Prophylaxis in Modern
State Constitutionalism: New Judicial Federalism and the Acknowledged
Prophylactic Rule, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 283, 303 (2003) (describing
Justice Scalia's dissent in Dickerson as criticizing the "use of any form of
prophylaxis in constitutionalism, expressing the view that doctrine should be
congruent with constitutional values, and therefore the Court lacks the authority to overprotect"); Yoo, supra note 7, at 1126-29. But see Caminker, supra note
15, at 28 n.91 (arguing that the common characterization of prophylactics of
"overprotecting" legal rights should end because it "wrongly assumes some
'natural' baseline of lesser protection").
126. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281-82 (1977).
127. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 446, 461, 465 (2000)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
128. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("[W]e have permitted the federal courts to exercise virtually unlimited equitable powers to remedy this alleged constitutional violation."); Yoo, supra note 7,
at 1128 (arguing that the expansion of judicial remedial authority in the
prophylactic and structural injunction cases was accompanied by an unwillingness of the Court to impose any meaningful limitation upon the courts' exercise
of equitable discretion); see also Hill, 530 U.S. at 762 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(declaring that "[pirophylaxis is the antithesis of narrowly tailoring").
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particular judge. Instead, prophylactic measures are constrained by two limiting principles routinely applied by the
courts in crafting prophylactic relief. First, the prophylactic
remedy must be narrowly targeted at redressing the proven
harm, rather than aimed at some ancillary social concern."'
Second, the affiliated conduct included in the prophylactic
relief must demonstrate a sufficient causal nexus to the
established harm.13 These limitations of prophylactic relief
emanate from the Article III requirement that judicial
power be confined to "cases or controversies."13 Thus,
prophylactic relief properly tailored to the two limiting
principles constitutes a legitimate exercise of the courts'
remedial power."2
1. Targeting the Legal Harm. The initial assumption
was that prophylaxis could not, and should not, be
explained as conforming to the tailoring rule. 33 Early
supporters of prophylactic remedies tried to justify the
presumed departure from tailoring. Professors Fiss and
Chayes argued that untailored prophylactic remedies were
needed to provide the courts with the necessary flexibility
to achieve social justice in public law cases.3 To them, the
beauty of the prophylactic remedy was its ability to work

129. See infra Part I.C.1; cf Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 204 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that
"'remediation' that is the traditional business of Anglo-American courts is relief
specifically tailored to the plaintiffs injury, and not any sort of relief that has
some incidental benefit to the plaintiff').
130. See infra Part I.C.2.
131. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Landsberg, supra note 2, at 956-58; cf.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) ("When transported into the Art. III
context, that principle, grounded as it is in the idea of separation of powers,
counsels against recognizing standing in a case brought, not to enforce specific
legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal
duties.").
132. See Thomas, ProphylacticRemedies, supra note 1, at 374-80.
133. See Chayes, supra note 9, at 1293-94 ("The form of relief does not flow
ineluctably from the liability determination, but is fashioned ad hoc."); Justice,
supra note 9, at 46-47.
134. See Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1982); Chayes, supra note 9; Fiss, supra note 65;
Justice, supra note 9, at 46-47.
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outside the traditional confines of the positive law to instill
public values.135
Professor Schoenbrod rejected this general attack on
the tailoring rule, and illustrated the long acceptance of the
rule as well as its continuing importance.136 He explained
that the remedial tailoring rule is intended to avoid social
activism by judges, minimize judicial intrusion on the defendant, and provide predictability in the discretionary
arena of equitable remedies.1 37 Schoenbrod though, like Fiss
and Chayes, approved of the use of prophylactic remedies.
He asserted that prophylactic injunctions could in fact constitute properly tailored relief. 3 He distinguished between
the terms and the aim of an injunction.1 39 For Schoenbrod,
as long as the aim of the injunction was tailored to the
proven harm, the terms of the injunction could permissibly
reach wider than the direct harm if necessary.14 That is, if
the prophylactic remedy furthered the purpose of the right
by aiming at returning the plaintiff to her rightful position
(i.e., the position she would have been in but for the harm),
then the terms could reach any affiliated legal conduct in
order to ensure protection and enforcement of the injunction. However, where that proportional aim was lacking,
prophylactic relief would be improper in scope.
Thus, the first rule of limitation for prophylactic relief
as explained by Professor Schoenbrod is that it must aim to
The Court has followed
remedy an existing harm.'
135. Justice, supra note 9, at 47 (arguing that the tailoring principle
fundamentally misleads because it suggests a formalistic quality that is not
actually present between right and remedy).
136. SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 133; Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 671.
137. Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 676, 691 ("Abandoning the tailoring
doctrine, however, is not a satisfactory alternative because doing so simply permits judges to engage in completely unconstrained policy making.").
138. Id. at 671.
139. Id. at 678.
140. Id. (arguing that a prophylactic measure that grants more than the
plaintiffs rightful position is appropriate if it furthers the goals of the law).
141. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977) ("[Flederal-court decrees
exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does
not violate the Constitution.. . ."); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996);
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 392 (Thomas, J., concurring); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S.
70, 91, 134-36 (1995); People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528,
534 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that equitable remediation should be "guided by
norms of proportionality. That is, the remedy must be tailored to the violation,
rather than the violation's being a pretext for the remedy. Violations of law
must be dealt with firmly, but not used to launch federal courts on ambitious
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Schoenbrod's principle requiring properly targeted relief by
rejecting remedial orders that improperly target social concerns other than the threatened legal harm."42 Sometimes
stated in doctrinal terms, the rule becomes that a remedial
decree must be designed to return the plaintiffs to their
rightful position where they would have been but for the
harm."' The lack of this requisite remedial goal has been
the most common failing of injunctive relief overturned by
the Supreme Court as overbroad.' In Missouri v. Jenkins,
the Court struck down prophylactic measures designed to
reverse white flight by creating attractive public schools in
the city.'45 The key failing of that remedial order was its aim
at a social problem-white flight-that was not itself a constitutional wrong.14 In Lewis v. Casey, the district court
schemes of social engineering") (citations omitted); Newman v. Alabama, 559
F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 1977) ("It does mean in the prison context that federal
courts should keep their eyes on the main objective, the Eighth Amendment
command for the eradication of cruel and unusual punishment. The remedy
must be designed to accomplish that goal, not to exercise judicial power for the
attainment of what we as individuals might like to see accomplished in the way
of ideal prison conditions.").
142. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 392; Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 134-36; Freeman v. Pitts,
503 U.S. 467 (1992); cf Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S.
947, 969-70 (1984) (invalidating state regulation of charitable solicitation because it was aimed not at fraud but at the percentage of funds collected in the
hope that it would sweep fraud in during the process).
143. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996); Lewis, 518 U.S. at
357 (1996); Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 88; Milliken, 433 U.S. at 280.
144. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 357-60; Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 134-36; Freeman,
503 U.S. at 487 (invalidating remedy requiring annual readjustment of racial
composition of schools to ensure "no majority of minority" from future housing
migration changes where remedy addressed emerging social problem rather
than redressing past violation of law or its consequences).
145. 515 U.S. 70 (1995), rev'g 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (ordering
prophylactic measures addressing magnet programs, capital improvements,
local property tax, and a Model United nations meeting hall wired for language).
146. The Jenkins Court invalidated the remedial decree because it was
designed for the purpose of achieving "desegregative attractiveness" to reverse
white flight rather than curing unconstitutional segregation. 515 U.S. at 91-98;
id. at 112 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the "authority contained in
Article III of the Constitution limit[s] the judiciary's institutional capacity to
prescribe palliatives for societal ills. The unfortunate fact of racial imbalance
and bias in our society, however pervasive or invidious, does not admit of
judicial intervention absent a constitutional violation"); id. at 136 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (holding that trial court "failed to target its equitable remedies in
this case specifically to cure the harm suffered by the victims"); see also Parker,
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aimed its prophylactic order at improving the management
of the prison library rather than the legal wrong of the
prisoners' denial of access to the courts. However, when
courts fail to react to legal wrongs, they step outside the
confines of their judicial powers, as Justice Thomas disThus, as Professor
cussed in his concurrence in Lewis.
Schoenbrod recognized, prophylactic relief, like all remedies, must be targeted to the established legal wrong to
avoid the risk of illegitimate judicial action. 9
Similarly, Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact prophylactic legislation has
been restricted to legislation that aims at an identified legal
wrong. The Supreme Court has interpreted Congress' power
under the Section 5 enforcement clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to be a remedial power. 5 ' Accordingly, the
supra note 18, at 487-506 (discussing in depth the facts and remedial significance of Missouri v. Jenkins).
147. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 392 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The District Court
also 'failed to target its equitable remedies in this case specifically to cure the
harm suffered by the victims' of unconstitutional conduct." (quoting Jenkins,
515 U.S. at 136)); see also FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 9, at 13-20 (noting that
judges in prison cases in the 1960s to 1980s uniformly sought to impose better
prison management conforming to industry standards rather than remediation
of the constitutional problem). In fairness, the district court's detour in Casey v.
Lewis, 773 F. Supp. 1365 (D. Ariz. 1991), seems to have been its belief that the
prophylactic remedy aimed at the prison law library ordered in Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), itself created a new actionable right and therefore
crafted its injunction to respond to the denial of the perceived Bounds right. See
infra text accompanying notes 345-62.
148. 518 U.S. at 385-93 (Thomas, J., concurring); accord Jenkins, 515 U.S.
at 114-138 (Thomas, J., concurring).
149. Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 671; SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 37,
353.
150. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997); Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 33, at
722-39 (exploring the meaning of remedial prophylactic legislation under
Section 5). The academic debate continues as to why the parameters of Section
5 legislative power should be interpreted analogously to the judicial power.
Most commentators continue to argue that the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence
is incorrect and that the Section 5 power should be construed broadly in the
same manner as other general legislative powers. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.,
NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES

148 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2002) (asking "why Congress should be confined to the
remedial. The fourteenth amendment assigns Congress the role of enforcing its
guarantees. The amendment assigns no role to the court."); Evan H. Caminker,
"Appropriate"Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV.
1127, 1131 (2001) (arguing that Section 5 power should be interpreted according
to rational relation test of regular Article I legislation); Samuel Estreicher &
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Court has used the analogue of judicial remedial power to
define the parameters of the legislature's designated remedial power."' In a recent spate of cases, the Court has
explained the doctrinal limitations of prophylactic legislation.'52 Commentators have universally criticized the Court
for its failure to establish criteria capable of distinguishing
appropriate from inappropriate remedial legislation, accusMargaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison, and the Future of
FederalAntidiscriminationLaw, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 109, 134 n.105 (finding the
argument that the Section 5 proportionality test may be justified by reference to
the law of remedies "ultimately unpersuasive, for it fails satisfactorily to
explain why Congress's power should be adjudged by the same standards that
govern the ability of lower courts to fashion remedies for constitutional or
statutory violations"). But see Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supranote 33, at 469-70
(arguing that the test may be justified by reference to the law of remedies
requiring any judicially crafted remedy must respond proportionally to the
wrong it seeks to redress); Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 33, at 722-24
(endorsing interpretation of Section 5 using judicial remedial analogues);
Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Fallingon the Federal Government? State Sovereign
Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81 TEX. L. REV.
1551 (2003) (reviewing JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER:
THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES (2002)) (disagreeing with Judge
Noonan and arguing for the plausibility of interpreting Section 5 as a
prophylactic remedial power). The short answer is that the drafters of Section 5
rejected a general legislative power to do all that was "necessary and proper,"
and instead, adopted language describing a remedial power to "enforce" the
Amendment by providing substitute remedies in the derogation of that responsibility by southern courts. See Thomas, supra note 33, at 707-09. In choosing to
circumscribe legislative power, the drafters of Section 5 must have intended
something different from the usual legislative authority. But see Ruth Colker,
The Supreme Court's Historical Errors in City of Boerne v. Flores, 43 B.C. L.
REV. 783 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court made significant historical
errors in interpreting Section 5 as a remedial rather than interpretive authority); James W. Fox, Jr., Re-readings and Misreadings: Slaughter-House,
Privileges or Immunities, and Section Five Enforcement Powers, 91 KY. L.J. 67
(2002) (tracing history of privileges and immunities clause and Section 5 to
suggest a source of broad interpretive power).
151. See Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 33, at 486 ("[Tjhe law of
remedies helps to provide a background understanding of what it means to
'enforce' a right within the meaning of Section 5. The Supreme Court should not
give Congress more latitude in determining whether it has exceeded its remedial power under Section 5 than the Court grants lower courts in determining
whether they have exceeded their remedial power."); Thomas, Remedial Rights,
supra note 33, at 714-39.
152. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); Bd. of Trs.
of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 62; Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999);
Flores, 521 U.S. at 507.
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ing the Court of endorsing a standard for unaccountable
judicial decisionmaking.'53 However, the criteria for prophylactic legislation are apparent on the face of the opinions,
but perhaps lack meaning in the absence of an accurate
understanding of judicial prophylaxis.14 For without restrictions on Section 5 relief, the remedial power becomes a
plenary power that contradicts the express bargain made in
the constitutional amendment.'55
The Court's first stated limitation of prophylactic legislation is that it, like prophylactic judicial relief, must be
targeted to address an identified constitutional violation.'56
153. See Post & Siegel, supra note 34, at 1949 (arguing that the current
Supreme Court "enforcement model" of Section 5 power does not offer a
coherent framework for distinguishing between Section 5 laws that unconstitutionally "interpret" the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 5 laws that merely
"enforce" it, and claiming that "[w]ithout guidance from the enforcement model
itself, the decisions of the Rehnquist Court have been driven by implicit policy
preferences"); NOONAN, supra note 150; Young, supra note 150, at 1575
(describing Judge Noonan's reaction to the Section 5 proportionality requirement: "Judge Noonan is shocked-shocked!-by the proportionality test: This
formula was unprecedented. Proportionality in legislation! Who would measure
the proportion?"); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100
MICH. L. REv. 80, 85-86 (2001) (describing the "crystal ball" or "phantom
legislative history" test of Section 5 proportionality established by the Court to
support its judicial activism in striking down acts of Congress); cf Caminker,
supra note 150, at 1133 (arguing that the "Court's decision to subject all
prophylactic Section 5 measures to significantly more rigorous means-ends
scrutiny than measures that carry into execution Congress' various Article I
and other powers cannot persuasively be defended").
154. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 (applying the "now familiar
principles" of prophylactic legislation to the Americans with Disabilities Act);
see also Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 33, at 481 (explaining Section 5
proportionality requirement by reference to the law of remedies); Landsberg,
supra note 2, at 926 ("Once one understands the bases for prophylactic rules, it
becomes possible to define the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate
judicial prophylactic action."); Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 33, at 720739 (explaining contours of prophylactic legislation by reference to cases
imposing prophylactic injunctions).
155. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-20 (indicating that "several limitations
inherent in § 5's text and constitutional context have been recognized since the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted .... These limitations are necessary to
prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from obliterating the Framers' carefully
crafted balance of power between the States and the National government.");
Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 33, at 487 ("If Congress were permitted to
enact rules that it calls 'prophylactic' without any proportionality review, it
could increase its power under Section 5 geometrically."); Remedial Rights,
supra note 33, at 727.
156. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735-37; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88-91; The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 12-13, 17 (1883); Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 33, at
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Initially, Congress must make findings sufficient to identify
an actual or perceived violation. 1 7 For the remedial posture
of Section 5 dictates that Congress react to a legal wrong,
like a court, rather than address a general societal problem,
which it may do under one of its alternative legislative
powers." 8 At its core, prophylactic legislation must be
targeted at the15 9legitimate end of responding to unconstitutional conduct.
The failure of Congress to aim its prophylactic legislation at a legitimate end has been the downfall of most of the
Section 5 legislation considered by the Supreme Court to
date. 6 ° However, in the Family Medical Leave Act
471, 481 (stating that Congress must first identify conduct transgressing Fourteenth Amendment); Remedial Rights, supra note 33, at 714-720 (discussing in
depth the requirement that Section 5 legislation respond to an identified violation of a constitutional right). Others have preferred to phrase this remedial
limitation in the traditional legislative powers terms of McCullough v.
Maryland and its interpretation of the necessary and proper clause, stating that
the legislation must be aimed at a legitimate end. E.g., J. Randy Beck, The
Heart of Federalism:Pretext Review of Means-End Relationships, 36 U.C. DAVis
L. REV. 407 (2003); Caminker, supra note 150, at 1127; Thomas, Remedial
Rights, supra note 33, at 721.
157. Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REV. 653, 667-69
(2000) (describing the importance of fact finding to valid Section 5 legislation);
Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 33, at 716; Erin Rosen, Case Note, An
Occasion for a More Thorough Analysis: The New Findings Requirement and
Congressional Power Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment After
United States v. Morrison, 90 CAL. L. REV. 573 (2002).
158. The benefit of enacting legislation under Section 5 is that the states
have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit for damages in the
Fourteenth Amendment, and thus Congress is able to enforce legislation by
monetary remedies. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 724; Garrett,531 U.S. at 363; Ronald D.
Rotunda, The Powers of Congress Under Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment.
After City of Boerne v. Flores, 32 IND. L. REV. 163, 169-70 (1998) (stating that
Congress considers Section 5 to be the preferable mode of regulating the states
because there is no interstate commerce requirement, eleventh amendment
state immunity, rule of general applicability, or budgetary requirements of
spending money); see also Morrison, 528 U.S. at 607 ("Every law enacted by
Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the
Constitution. 'The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written."'
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176 (1803))).
159. Beck, supra note 156; Caminker, supra note 150; Thomas, Remedial
Rights, supra note 33, at 714-21.
160. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366-72 (invalidating the Americans with
Disabilities Act as applied to state employers on grounds that Congress failed to
identify a predicate constitutional violation); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625-26
(invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, which provided a civil remedy
for victims of domestic violence because the attempted prophylactic legislation
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("FMLA"), Congress finally got it right. The Supreme Court
held in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs
that Congress properly targeted its prophylactic legislation
of the FMLA by aiming at gender discrimination by the
states against women in the workplace.16 ' The FMLA
targeted gender discrimination against working women by
enacting prophylactic measures specifying twelve-week unpaid family leave for both sexes to address the adverse
employment action against women.'62 Thus, where prophylactic remedial legislation properly responds to an identified
legal harm, it, like judicial prophylaxis, will be upheld.
2. Sufficient Causal Nexus. In addition to a proper aim,
prophylactic remedies are limited to addressing legal
conduct that has a sufficient causal nexus to the harm. The
causal nexus is established where the affiliated conduct
bears a factual relationship to the harm and the relation-

improperly aimed at the societal problem of domestic violence committed by
private actors rather than gender discrimination perpetrated by the states);
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91 (invalidating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
for targeting state employers' violations of the statute rather than
unconstitutional conduct); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999) (invalidating the Patent and Plant
Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act permitting damages actions
against state governments for patent infringement on grounds that the statute's
basic aims were to provide a uniform remedy for patent infringement and to
place States on the same footing as private parties which was a legitimate aim
under Congress' Article I powers but not under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997) (invalidating
Religious Freedom Restoration Act for targeting legal laws of zoning, land-use,
and fair housing as applied to religious practices).
161. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735 ("In sum, the States' record of unconstitutional
participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the
administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of
prophylactic § 5 legislation."). Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas dissented
on this point, finding that the evidence failed to establish a constitutional
violation by the states at which prophylactic legislation could be targeted. See
id. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 749 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The
question is not whether the family leave provision is a congruent and
proportional response to general gender-based stereotypes in employment
which 'ha[ve] historically produce discrimination in the hiring and promotion of
women'; the question is whether it is a proper remedy to an alleged pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination by States in the grant of family leave. The
evidence of gender-based stereotypes is too remote to support the required
showing.") (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
162. Id. at 735-37; see Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C)
(2000).
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ship is of sufficiently close degree to justify the inclusion of
the conduct in the prophylactic order." 3 This type of causal
nexus test is seen in other areas of the law where it is used
to restrict judicial action to the parameters of the relevant
law while providing the necessary flexibility to apply that
law to the particular facts of each case." In the case of
prophylactic relief, the nexus test aids in establishing the
required remedial proportionality of mandating that the
scope of injunctive relief conform to the scope of the harm in
order to avoid judicial overreaching. The nexus test circumscribes the scope of the harm by including within the definition of "harm" that secondary conduct which has a sufficient causal connection to the primary illegality. Thus, the
M

163. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1066 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "nexus" as "[a]
connection or link, often a causal one").
164. For example, parallels exist in the law of antitrust, takings, state
action, and sometimes standing. In antitrust law, a nexus test is used to
determine the availability of judicial relief by evaluating whether plaintiffs
business losses are of the type that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent
and flow from the unlawful conduct of the defendant. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (holding that injuries must be "of
the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and that flows from that
which makes defendants' acts unlawful"); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc.,
479 U.S. 104, 122 (1986) (holding same for injunctive relief). In takings law, the
court must determine whether there is an "essential nexus" between the
legitimate state interest asserted for the taking and the permit condition
extracted. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994); Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). In the state action cases, a nexus
test requires a "sufficiently close relationship" between the state and the
private actor in order for the private action to be attributable to the state.
Wittstock v. Mark A. Van Sile, Inc., 330 F.3d 899, 902 (6th Cir. 2003); Kirtley v.
Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2003). To establish taxpayer standing for
constitutional claims, plaintiffs must show their complaint falls within the zone
of interest protected by the law by establishing a logical nexus between their
status and the claim. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968) ("Such inquiries
into the nexus between the status asserted by the litigant and the claim he
presents are essential to assure that he is a proper and appropriate party to
invoke federal judicial power."); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759 (1984) ("The
idea of separation of powers that underlies standing doctrine explains why our
cases preclude the conclusion that respondents' alleged injury 'fairly can be
traced to the challenged action' of the IRS. That conclusion would pave the way
generally for suits challenging, not specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but the particular programs agencies establish to carry out their
legal obligations.") (citation omitted). But see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 203 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that dual nexus test of standing had "fallen into desuetude" and
was a proxy for the requirement that plaintiffs injury be redressable by the
court).
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nexus test for prophylactic relief is used to provide the
courts with the flexibility to reach legal conduct needed to
prevent future harm while constraining those courts from
going beyond their remedial mandate. 6 '
The first element of the causal nexus test for prophylactic measures is a required factual connection between the
affiliated conduct and the harm. The law in other contexts
imposes such a factual nexus requirement to assure that
judicial action address the type of harm prohibited by law.'66
For prophylactic relief, the requisite factual relationship
can be shown by demonstrating that the affiliated and illegal conduct share the same subject matter or the same
issue. 67 This threshold requirement, while seemingly loose,

165. Cf. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390 (requiring nexus to distinguish between "an
appropriate exercise of the police power and an improper exercise of eminent
domain" by determining "whether the requirement has some reasonable relationship or nexus to the use to which the property is being made or is merely
being used as an excuse for taking property simply because at that particular
moment the landowner is asking the city for some license or permit").
166. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (finding no factual nexus between the commission's asserted interest in promoting public visual access to the ocean and the
permit condition requiring lateral public access along the plaintiffs beachfront
lot); cf. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387 (discussing absence of factual nexus in Nollan
and finding essential nexus in this case where governmental purposes of
preventing flooding and traffic congestion were connected to the permit conditions requiring easements for flood plain and pedestrian/bicycle walkway);
Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489 (holding that antitrust plaintiff failed to prove
that injury though causally related was of the "type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent" where business losses resulted from increased rather than
restrained competition); Flast,392 U.S. at 102 (requiring the plaintiff establish
a dual nexus for standing of showing "a logical link" between the plaintiffs
taxpayer status and "the type of legislative enactment attacked" and a "nexus
between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement
alleged"); Gumm v. Apfel, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Kan. 1998) (requiring factual
nexus for social security disability claim between impairment and the claimed
pain for which plaintiff is claiming disability); Farb v. Fed. Kemper Life
Assurance Co., 213 F.R.D. 264, 267 (D. Md. 2003) (identifying required "factual
nexus" between amendment and original complaint for amendment of
pleadings).
167. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 (1996); cf. Riley v. Nat'l Fed. of the
Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 793 (1981) (invalidating law regulating
charitable solicitation on the basis of the amount of funds collected by the
organization due to the lack of nexus between the amount of funds retained by
the fundraiser and the likelihood of fraud); Lau v Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571
(1974) (administrative prophylactic regulations promulgated for Title VI may go
beyond the specific law as long as they are "reasonably related" to its
antidiscrimination mandate).
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is not always met.'68 In Lewis v. Casey,'69 all nine Supreme
Court Justices found that the prophylactic measures addressing noise, lighting, law book pocket parts, and library
hours did not share the same type of legal issue as the
70
proven harm of illiterate inmate access to the courts.
While the measures dealt with the general topic of legal
assistance to inmates, the harm proven in the case related
only to illiterate and non-English-speaking prisoners.
Thus, all measures not factually connected with illiterate
inmates were omitted from the decree. 171 Measures, however, providing individual lawyers or jailhouse assistants to
aid the illiterate inmates were factually connected to the
subject matter of the harm and properly included in
injunctive relief.7 2 In another example, the court in the
school desegregation case of People Who Care v. Rockford
Board of Education171 struck down prophylactic measures
imposing racial quotas for teachers." The Seventh Circuit
held that the harm established at trial related only to racial
discrimination against students, not teachers, and thus, the
measures addressing the societal concern of faculty diverrelated to warrant inclusity were not sufficiently factually
75
sion in the remedial decree.
Second, the factual connection between the affiliated
conduct and the harm must be sufficiently close to justify

168. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 771 (1994)
(invalidating prophylactic measure banning abortion protests within 36-foot
buffer zone on private property where there was no evidence that protestors
standing on private property obstructed access to the clinic or otherwise contributed to the interference with plaintiffs' rights).
169. 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
170. Id. at 356-60; id. at 390-93 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 393-98
(Souter, J., concurring); id. at 409 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
171. Id. at 356-60, 397-98 ("At the outset, therefore, we can eliminate from
the proper scope of this injunction provisions directed at special services or
special facilities required by non-English speakers, by prisoners in lockdown,
and by the inmate population at large. If inadequacies of this character exist,
they have not been found to have harmed any plaintiff in this lawsuit, and
hence were not the proper object of this District Court's remediation.").
172. Id. at 348, 359-61.
173. 111 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 1997).
174. Id. at 532, 534.
175. Id. at 534. The Seventh Circuit also invalidated prophylactic measures
addressing quotas for racial composition on the cheerleading squad finding that
the provision was "indefensible" and could not possible be justified in the
absence of evidence of discrimination against cheerleaders. Id. at 538.
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the inclusion of the conduct in the court's order. 7 ' This type
of causal nexus requiring a sufficiently close degree of
relationship is analogous to nexus requirements imposed on
judicial action in other areas of the law.'77 The degree of
relationship required for prophylactic relief is established
by showing a foreseeable and proximate causal link between
the measures and the harm. The foreseeability limitation
requires some basis of knowledge to anticipate that the
prophylactic measure has the potential to prevent harm.'
For example, if expert testimony during the trial indicated
that the lack of anti-harassment training fostered a sexually hostile environment, then there is a basis of knowledge
to anticipate that a measure requiring training might work
to prevent harm.7 9
The proximate cause limitation of prophylaxis looks for
an indirect cause and effect relationship between the affili-

176. Cf United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
("A court in both contexts [money damages and equitable relief] must base its
relief on some clear 'indication of a significant causal connection between the
conduct enjoined or mandated and the violation found directed toward the
remedial goal intended.'").
177. See infra text accompanying notes 193-94 (discussing causal nexus
required for consequential damages and reparative injunctions); see, e.g., Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (imposing "rough proportionality"
test as second prong of nexus test requiring "some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent
to the impact of the proposed development"); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 759 (1984) (denying standing in part because of the lack of causal nexus
between the injury alleged of school desegregation and the defendants' conduct
of failing to deny tax-exempt status to private schools discriminating on basis of
race); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)
(holding that antitrust plaintiffs "must prove more than injury causally linked
to an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury,
which is to say injury... that flows from that which makes defendants' acts
unlawful"); PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS,
TEXT, CASES 85 (5th ed. 1997) (describing nexus requirement of antitrust injury
law as intended to evaluate whether the loss is connected closely enough with
the remedial purpose of the antitrust laws).
178. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 660 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "foreseeability" as
"[tihe quality of being reasonably anticipatable").
179. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Neal v. D.C.
Dep't of Corr., No. CIV.A93-2420, 1995 WL 517244, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1995);
Women Prisoners v. D.C. Dep't of Corrs., 877 F. Supp. 634, 666 (D.D.C. 1994);
see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 21 (1971)
(tailoring prophylactic measures of gerrymandering districts, busing, and ratios
to address location of schools that evidence showed in the past had been used as
a potent weapon for creating or maintaining a state-segregated school system).
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ated conduct and the harm.18 Proximate cause in general is
a concept that limits the wrongdoer's liability rather than
imposing responsibility for every possible connected harm
or consequence.1 8 1 In the prophylactic remedy context, the
proximate cause requirement limits the reach of judicial
equity by restricting measures to those actions that might
potentially protect against harm. The proximate cause limitation works prospectively to evaluate whether there is a
potential causal link between the affiliated conduct and the
harm. For example, in Missouri v. Jenkins,l1 2 the Supreme
Court struck down a prophylactic measure increasing
teacher salaries to make the public schools more attractive
to white students who had fled the schools in order to
ultimately desegregate the schools." 3 The Court held that
the segregation had not caused the white flight and that the
salary measures were simply too far removed from the
harm to be an acceptable remedial means.' Similarly, in
180. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 213 (7th ed., 1999) (defining "proximate
cause" as "a cause that is legally sufficient to result in liability").
181. See Graybill v. City of New York, 247 F. Supp. 2d 345, 351-52 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (using proximate cause notion to limit reach of Congress' 911 legislation
for injuries resulting from or related to the terrorist attacks: "[Piroximate
causation provides a useful framework for limiting the scope of that
provision .... [Tihe tort concept of proximate causation,... guides judges and
juries in deciding how far a tortfeasor's liability stretches. Proximate causation
limits a tortfeasor's liability to the expected, natural or foreseeable

consequences of his or her wrongful conduct."); see also PROSSER

AND KEETON ON

TORTS § 41, 264 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)
("'Proximate cause'-in itself an unfortunate term-is merely the limitation
which the courts have placed upon the actor's responsibility for the
consequences of the actor's conduct. In a philosophical sense, the consequences
of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event go back to the dawn
of human events, and beyond. But any attempt to impose responsibility upon
such a basis would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts and would 'set
society on edge and fill the courts with endless litigation.' As a practical matter,
legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely
connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in
imposing liability. Some boundary must be set to liability for the consequences
of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy.") (quoting
North v. Johnson, 58 Minn. 242, 59 N.W. 1012 (1894)).
182. 515 U.S. 70, 94, 100 (1995).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 94-95, 100. The Court in fact suggested that the remedy of
desegregation actually caused the white flight rather than the harm of racial
segregation. Id. at 95 (citing the record in the liability phase of trial, and citing
United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 491 (1995),
which recognized that implementation of a desegregation remedy may result in
white flight).
THE LAW OF
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Rizzo v. Goode,'85 the Supreme Court invalidated injunctive
relief imposed after instances of officer violence were proven
at trial."6 The Court struck down prophylactic measures
ordering a civilian complaint procedure, new institutional
policies, and departmental training where those measures
addressed departmental conduct that was not shown to
have contributed to the individual violations.'87 In Cardenas
v. Massey,'88 the Third Circuit overturned prophylactic relief
mandating the adoption of an anti-discrimination policy regarding race, because it would not have prevented future
harm to the plaintiff who was no longer employed by the
defendant.189
The nexus required for prophylactic measures is not a
close or strict requirement.1 "° For if the attendant conduct
itself were so closely intertwined with the harm, it would
likely constitute primary conduct directly causing the harm
that would be subject to regular, rather than prophylactic,
injunctive relief.' The nexus for prophylactic conduct must
be something less than that connection which makes the
conduct itself illegal in order to have a meaningful distinc185. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
186. Id.
187. Id. See also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1977) (invalidating
injunctive relief imposing prophylactic measures of busing on Detroit suburban
school districts in order to cure white flight, because the suburbs were not
involved in the educational segregation and therefore were not a proper target
of the remedy).
188. 269 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001).
189. Id. The case was not brought as a class action, and thus the policy
relief could not be justified as a remedy to protect employees similar to the
plaintiff. This lack of causal nexus can also explain the Court's decision in
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435 (1976). The Court
invalidated a reparative injunction requiring annual readjustment of racial
composition of schools to address housing migration finding that the migration
was not a resulting consequence of the segregation. In addition, a causal nexus
sufficient for prophylactic relief was missing because housing was not determined to be an original contributing factor to the school segregation and thus
would not be affiliated conduct that could be restricted to prevent a reoccurrence of the same harm. See id.
190. Cf. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (rejecting strict
test of exacting proportionality for nexus in takings law finding the constitution
does not require such exacting scrutiny given the nature of the interests
involved).
191. See, e.g., Wittstock v. Mark A. Van Sile, Inc., 330 F.3d 899, 902 (6th
Cir. 2003) (requiring a substantially close nexus between private actor and
state actor in order to treat a private entity as the government for purposes of
the state action doctrine in order to impose liability upon a private entity).
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tion apart from other liability and remedies. Thus, it is
sufficient to satisfy the nexus test if it is shown that the affiliated conduct sought to be included in the prophylactic
order has a tendency or potential to facilitate the harm or
its prevention. 9
Such principles of limitation based on a sufficient
causal link also apply to remedies designed to redress conduct and losses from the primary harm. In the corrective
remedial contexts of consequential damages and reparative
injunctions, courts have historically used principles of foreseeability, proximate causation, and remoteness to limit the
reach of judicial relief.'93 Consequential damages are
awarded to address the secondary losses occurring as a consequence of the demonstrated harm.' Historically, there
was some skepticism about awarding such damages out of
the concern over fabrication or windfall to the plaintiff.9 '
Some limitations on consequential damages remain as a result of this concern, operating to deny such damages if they
are unforeseeable, not proximately caused by the legal
harm avoidable by the plaintiff, too speculative, or too remote.9 In general, though, the law has evolved to wide192. Cf. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (adopting an intermediate test for degree of
relationship required under the nexus test of takings law, requiring a showing
of a reasonable relationship between condition and purpose which is more than
generalized statements but less than specific, exacting proportionality);
Brunswick v. Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977) (describing
prophylactic provisions of the antitrust law as those which proscribe conduct
that has a "tendency" or "potential" to cause certain harms).
193. See Parker, supra note 18, at 521 ("In short, the right-remedy test
depends on a knowable and ascertainable proximate cause connection between
the violation and its effects, but proximate cause is rarely a useful concept in
public law litigation.").
194. See DOBBS, supra note 59, at 304; see also LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 61
("Consequential damages should refer to everything that happens to plaintiff as
a result of this initial loss."); but see Schonfeld v. Hilliard, 218 F.3d 164, 176 (2d
Cir. 2000) ("Special' or 'consequential' damages, on the other hand, seek to
compensate a plaintiff for additional losses (other than the value of the promised performance) that are incurred as a result of the defendant's breach.").
195. See generally Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 ENG. REP. 145 (1854) (limiting
recovery of consequential damages for breach of contract because lost profits of
mill were not foreseeable).
196. See DOBBS, supra note 59, at 318-21 (discussing rules inhibiting recovery of consequential damages, including certainty, proximate cause, foreseeability, and avoidable consequences); LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 63 (identifying
limits on consequential damages of causation, foreseeability, and remoteness);
see also Roy Ryden Anderson, Incidental and ConsequentialDamages, 7 J. L. &
COMMERCE 327, 330 (1987) (stating that the requirements for recovering conse-
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spread acceptance of consequential damages that are foreseeable by the defendant 91 7 and proximately caused by the
harm."'

Similarly, reparative injunctive remedies, as discussed
above, commonly address the consequences of past harm in
order to prevent the continuation of that harm into the future.'99 The Court has used the notion of proximate cause to
define the boundaries of proper reparative relief.20" For exquential damages under the UCC "include proving that the injury was foreseeable, that the loss was reasonably certain in amount and that the loss could not
have been reasonably avoided by the aggrieved party"); see generally Evra Corp.
v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982) (explaining the economic
basis for the limitations on consequential damages).
197. Cf. Centerline Inv. Co. v. Tri-Cor Indus., 80 S.W.3d 499, 503 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2002) ("We agree with Centerline that including a provision for 'consequential' and 'any and all' damages in a lease broadens the scope of damages
beyond those that are the 'natural and direct consequence' of the breach, but
even consequential damages are limited. If consequential damage clauses were
interpreted to allow recovery for 'any and all' damages, however remote, they
would include damages entirely unimagined and unforeseeable by the parties
and 'stretch infinitely in time.' The law has therefore limited consequential
damages to those that are 'within the contemplation of the parties at the time of
contracting, or 'foreseeable' to them.'") (quoting DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 228,
770 (2d ed. Hornbook Series, 1993)).
198. See U.C.C. § 2-715 (authorizing buyer's damages for losses proximately
caused); Caspe v. Aaacon Auto Transp., Inc., 658 F.2d 613, 617 (8th Cir. 1981)
("The general rule does not require the plaintiff to show that the actual harm
suffered was the most foreseeable of possible harms. He need only demonstrate
that his harm was not so remote as to make it unforeseeable to a reasonable
man at the time of contracting.") (quoting Hector Martinez & Co. v. S. Pac.
Transp. Co., 606 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1979)). However, the nomenclature of
"consequential" damages still seems to connote the historical disfavor. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (requiring foreseeability to recover

consequential damages); James M. Fischer,

UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES

21

(1999) (distinguishing consequential damages that plaintiff must establish the
causal relationship between the loss and the wrong from general damages that
are presumed to follow inevitably from the wrong); LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 63
("[M]y own sense is that little of the traditional hostility to special or consequential damages remains. This is especially true in tort, but consequential
damages are now much more likely to be awarded in contract as well."); Paul S.
Turner, Consequential Damages: Hadley v. Baxendale Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 54 SMU L. REV. 655 (2001) (identifying the common practitioner definition of consequential damages as unforeseeable damages that are
not recoverable). Thus, like prophylactic relief, remedies addressing secondary
rather than direct harms still retain a pejorative label despite their wide acceptance in judicial practice.
199. See DOBBS, supra note 59, at 225; LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 263.
200. See LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 292; see, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S.
467, 496 (1992) ("The vestiges of segregation that are the concern of the law in a
school case may be subtle and intangible but nonetheless they must be so real
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ample, in Milliken v. Bradley,"' the Court upheld an injunction ordering remedial education for students from segregated schools, finding that their low academic performance
was a consequence of the segregation. 2 At times, the Court
has found this causation link to be easily satisfied through
the use of presumptions, 203 while at other times it has required a more tangible basis for assessing the causal link.
However, where the problem existing after a legal violation
is shown not to be a result of the initial harm, such as
where it is attributable to an intervening act, that problem
is not a proper component of reparative relief. For example,
in Freeman v. pitts,2 11 the Court terminated an injunction
addressing post-harm residential segregation caused by intervening private housing migration rather than by the
original de jure school segregation. 5 The reparative injunction cases thus illustrate the core principle that equitable
remedies must be flexible to provide complete relief to the
plaintiff, but that they, like consequential damages, cannot
be limitless.
This same limitation of prophylaxis to reaching only
causally linked conduct is also seen in the analogous area of
that they have a causal link to the de jure violation being remedied."); Milliken
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (holding that remedy reaching non-party
suburbs might be justified if the suburban school districts' acts caused racial
segregation in the city); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-82 (1977)
(Milliken II) (imposing remedy to address consequences caused by initial constitutional violation); see also Parker, supra note 18 (criticizing the Court's reliance on the proximate causation notion in constructing injunctive relief).
201. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
202. Id. at 291; see also LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 292 (discussing Milliken
and its principle of injunctions addressing consequential harms).
203. Compare Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (requiring findings demonstrating that school segregation caused the effect or impact of citywide racial segregation in order to uphold system wide busing
remedy), with Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (DaytonII)
(using presumptions to conclude that residential segregation was a result of
school segregation in few programs).
204. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
205. See id. at 494 ("If the unlawful de jure policy of a school system has
been the cause of the racial imbalance in student attendance, that condition
must be remedied. The school district bears the burden of showing that any
current imbalance is not traceable, in a proximate way, to the prior violation.
The findings of the District Court that the population changes which occurred
in DeKalb County were not caused by the policies of the school district, but
rather by independent factors, are consistent with the mobility that is a distinct
characteristic of our society."); accord Pasadena v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435
(1976).

2004]

THE PROPHYLACTIC REMEDY

349

prophylactic legislation. The Supreme Court has limited
prophylactic legislation to regulating legal conduct that has
a sufficient causal nexus to the identified harm."6 The
Court's label for this nexus test in the prophylactic legislation context is "congruence and proportionality" and it mirrors in substance the test for properly tailored judicial prophylactic remedies.0 ' Prophylactic legislation must be
congruent, that is, it must have a corresponding or overlapping factual nexus with the identified harm. 0' And prophylactic legislation must be proportional in scope to the
identified harm by reaching affiliated conduct only where
that conduct has a sufficiently close causal link with the
harm." 9 In other words, Congress must use appropriate remedial means to achieve its ends rather than simply using
any and all means to achieve its legitimate goal.210 For
without this limitation upon the reach of the legislative
remedy, Congress creates rather than remedies rights
which are outside the scope of the Section 5 power.
206. See Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 33, at 727.
207. E.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001); City of Boerne v.
P.F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-26
(2000). Commentators have been confused by the apparent redundancy of the
Court's "congruent and proportional" test and have attempted to provide more
meaningful definitions for these terms by reference to legislative rather than
remedial concepts. See Beck, supra note 156, at 429-30 ("Of course, in fairness
to the Court, it may not have focused much on any precise conceptual distinction between these two components, instead wielding the phrase loosely to
capture a set of interrelated and perhaps somewhat amorphous ideas about
means-ends relationships. As a result, perhaps one should not push too hard to
divine the precise and separable content of 'congruence' and 'proportionality' as
used by the Court."); Caminker, supra note 150, at 1153.
208. Professor Beck describes the congruence test as requiring that the legislation actually be a means by which the end can be achieved. Beck, supra note
156, at 434.
209. Professors Caminker and Beck describe the proportionality requirement as requiring that the means be the appropriate size, shape, and necessary
response to the identified end. See Beck, supra note 156, at 434; Caminker,
supra note 150.
210. See Morrison, 528 U.S. at 625-26 ("[P]rophylactic legislation under § 5
must have a 'congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented
or remedied and the means adopted to that end.'") (quoting Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 (1999)).
Contra Caminker, supra note 150 (arguing that legitimate ends should justify
the use of all rationally related means); Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 672
(properly targeted prophylactic remedy justifies court's use of any and all remedial means to accomplish that purpose).
211. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) ("There must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
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The threshold factual nexus between the prophylactic
measures and the legal violation was missing from the prophylactic legislation at issue in Board of Trustees of the
212 The Supreme
University of Alabama v. Garrett.
Court in
Garrett invalidated the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") as applied to state employers.213 The factual nexus
was missing because the ADA provisions imposing workplace rules for state employers of disabled employees did
not relate to the legislative findings of workplace discrimination by non-state actors and discrimination by the state
in the. non-employment
settings
of public services
•
21
and pub••
211
lic accommodations." As in Lewis v. Casey, the prophylactic measures related to the subject matter only at the
most general subject level-that is disability discrimination-and did not connect on the specific subject matter
level by relating to the same actor of the state in the same
context of employment.216 Similarly, in United States v.
217 the attempted
Morrison,
prophylactic measures providing
federal remedies for private domestic violence, related
generally to the identified subject matter of gender
discrimination, but failed to correspond to the subject
matter of the Fourteenth Amendment which addresses
discrimination by state rather than private actors.21 The

and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may
become substantive in operation and effect."); see also Beck, supra note 156, at
411 ("If Congress regulates conduct far beyond the scope of any potential Fourteenth Amendment violations, a court may justifiably find the statute pretextual in that it aims at some end or object other than enforcement of Fourteenth
Amendment rights.")
212. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
213. Id. at 374.
214. Id. at 369-70, 371 n.7 (noting that while the congressional record contained many instances of general and historical discrimination against the
disabled, few addressed the discriminatory activities of the state).
215. 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
216. See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 371 n.7 (2001); Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 356-57 (1996) (holding that causal nexus between remedy and
harm not met where both addressed general subject of prison legal assistance
rather than specific issue of illiterate prisoner access to the courts). Cf. Nollan
v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (holding that nexus required
for valid regulatory taking not met where general interest of enhancing the
public's ability to traverse to and along the shorefront was disconnected from
the permit condition requiring lateral public access along plaintiffs beachfront).
217. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
218. Id. at 621, 625-26; Beck, supra note 156, at 435; Thomas, Remedial
Rights, supra note 33, at 729-30.
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Court held that the measures regulating the conduct of
private perpetrators were not congruous with the
discriminatory harm caused by state actors.219
In contrast, the required causal nexus was sufficiently
established by Congress in enacting the Voting Rights Act,
which outlawed literacy tests.22 ° In Katzenbach v. Moran,
the Supreme Court upheld the prophylactic legislation of
the voting act because it addressed the legal conduct of literacy tests that were factually related to the states' racial
discrimination denying minorities the right to vote. 2 ' While
the Supreme Court had held literacy tests themselves to be
permissible conduct,222 Congress found that the state tests
contributed to racial discrimination in voting and government services.2 2' 3 The Katzenbach Court upheld the prophylactic legislation proscribing the legal conduct of the tests
because they were sufficiently connected with the discriminatory harm; legislative findings showed that the tests
causally contributed to the denial of the right to vote and
thus it was foreseeable that continued use of the test would
facilitate more harm.224
Thus, the Court's prophylactic legislation jurisprudence
reinforces the limiting principles of prophylactic remedies.
Legislation can be prophylactic, in addition to being reparative or preventive, which allows Congress to go beyond the
illegality itself to regulate permissible conduct in order to
avoid future harm. 225 However, limitations upon the content
and reach of prophylactic legislation are necessary to prevent remedial power from converting into a general legislative power. 226 As previously discussed, these same concerns
219. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625-26.
220. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373 (contrasting invalid prophylactic legislation with the appropriate prophylactic legislation of the voting rights cases);
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626 (explaining that the Court upheld the prophylactic
legislation in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), because it properly
targeted the type of harm prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment).
221. 384 U.S. 641, 652-53 (1966); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding prophylactic measures of prohibiting literacy test
pursuant to remedial power of the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment).
222. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45
(1959).
223. See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 653.
224. Id.
225. See Garrett,531 U.S. at 365.
226. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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of extrinsic assertions of power dominate the analysis of judicial prophylactic remedies. In both cases, the doctrinal
limitations of the reach of prophylaxis are designed to confine the actor to the limited scope of its constitutionallydesignated power, while at the same time facilitating the
flexibility necessary to remedy modern and more complex
wrongs and legal problems.227
II. JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE CHOICE OF PROPHYLACTIC
RELIEF

Broad equitable remedies like prophylaxis often trigger
concerns that judges, in imposing such relief, are overstepping their authority by injecting their own personal views of
right and wrong into the case. The reality of the process
by which prophylactic remedies are chosen for a particular
case, however, defies this portrayal of arbitrary remedial
decisionmaking. Judges choose prophylactic remedies not
as a default, but as a less restrictive alternative to other relief.229 Defendants are given the first opportunity to craft
their own solution to the legal problem or the courts will
initially impose the less restrictive alternative of a negative, preventive injunction.23 ° It is only where those other
remedies of private resolution and limited intrusion fail
that courts then turn to the more precise and powerful remedial weapon of prophylaxis. Judges carefully craft the
prophylactic measures based on the evidence and argumen227. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000) ("Difficult and
intractable problems often require powerful remedies, and we have never held
that § 5 precludes Congress from enacting reasonably prophylactic legislation."); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, at 31 (1971)
(upholding prophylactic relief and suggesting that the Court "sought to suggest
the nature of limitations without frustrating the appropriate scope of equity");
Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (1978).

228. See Mishkin, supra note 78, at 960 ("The judge's attention is focused on
what he sees as an evil. He is at the same time offered a proposal for action
which promises to cure that evil. He is in a position to command the implementation of that proposal (or some other to the same end), and he feels that he
ought to use his power to the end of remedying the perceived evil....
[R]ecognizing the validity and strength of these feelings, and of the commendable personal desire to act against a perceived evil, is not the same as accepting
them as a legitimate basis for a federal court to exercise its power. Appointment
as a federal judge does not, to use the classic phrase, confer "a roving commission to do good.").
229. See infra Part II.A.
230. See infra text accompanying notes 238-43.
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tation presented during the case.23 ' As in any decisionmaking process, judges may rely on the parties, experts, evidence or legal precedent to formulate a decision as to the
appropriate remedy. 23 1 Courts that impose prophylactic
remedies without following this cautious and restrained
approach may have
their orders invalidated as an abuse of
33
equitable power.
A. Prophylaxis as the Least Restrictive Alternative
As explained thus far, the prophylactic remedy has
tremendous power to prevent harm by addressing affiliated
conduct with specific, enforceable measures.2 4 The remedy,
however, poses the inherent risk of unnecessarily regulating defendants' behavior. Unlike all other remedies, prophylaxis directs defendants' legal conduct that contributes
to rather than violates the law.235 The restriction of attendant conduct then must be necessary for valid remedial
purposes such as effective enforcement, as we have seen.
Moreover, courts are cautious in imposing this remedy and
do so only after considering other options. Thus while
courts have not articulated a standard that prophylaxis
must be demonstrated to be the least restrictive alternative,
in practice, the remedy has been applied only when it is
crafted in the least restrictive manner and more permissive
alternative remedies are not available.2 3 The Court's shorthand for this cautious use of prophylactic relief reiterated
in the school desegregation and prison cases is that "the
federal courts in devising a remedy must take into account

231. See infra Part II.B.
232. See infra text accompanying notes 293-306.
233. See Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra note 1, at 391-92, 394-96
(arguing that prophylactic remedy imposed as remedy of first choice, in the absence of defendant input or defiance, constituted an abuse of discretion).
234. See supra Part L.A-B.
235. See Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 629 (stating that the use of equitable
discretion to order prophylactic remedies effectively enforces plaintiffs' rights,
"but takes away the defendant's right to engage in perfectly legal conduct").
236. And thus courts have interpreted the Prison Litigation Reform Act's
requirement that prospective relief ordered in a prison conditions case be the
"least restrictive necessary" as still permitting the continued use of prophylactic
relief. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001).
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the interests of state and local authorities in managing
their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution."237
The first evidence of caution and consideration of the
defendants' interests is the developed rule that courts must
give defendants the first opportunity to avoid the harm.238
Courts assessing the necessity for prophylactic relief must
give the defendants the first opportunity to propose their
own remedy for the harm once a finding of a legal violation
has been made.3 The Supreme Court in Lewis v. Casey
emphasized that this consideration is a requirement of the
remedial process, and not a mere notion of deference.2 40 Accordingly, eight Justices concurred that a critical defect in
the case that would have alone justified reversal was the
trial court's failure to give the state prison defendants the
first opportunity to remedy the harm. Such a judicial step
relies upon the significant expertise of the defendant in
managing its own organization, and provides significant respect for the autonomy and self-governance of the defendant in recognition of separation of powers concerns.
Thus, it is the common practice of district courts to initially
approve the defendants' remedial plans.243
237. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977); See also Missouri v.
Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) ("one of the most important considerations
governing the exercise of equitable power is a proper respect for the integrity
and function of local government institutions"); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d
283 (5th Cir. 1977) ("We all understand, of course, that federal courts have no.
authority to address state officials out of office or to fire state employees or to
take over the performance of their functions. Most assuredly, however, in
proper cases a federal court can, and must, compel state officials or employees
to perform their official duties in compliance with the Constitution of the
United States.").
238. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 818 (1977); Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 362 (1996).
239. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 362, 393 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 26-33 (W.D. Mo.
1985), affd, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986).
240. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 362-63, 393, 398.
241. Id.
242. See id. at 361-63, 398.
243. See Parker, supra note 18, at 494-95 (describing how the district court
approved the defendants' plans in Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F.Supp. 19 (W.D.
Mo. 1985), with little change). However, courts evaluate the efficacy of the defendants' remedial proposal and do not simply rubber stamp their plan. See,
e.g., Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1125 (D. Del. 1977) (evaluating
defendants' remedial proposal for unconstitutional prison conditions and finding that "these proposals by the State represent an important initial step
toward ameliorating the present conditions at DCC. If the State, however, is
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Only where defendants fail to propose or effectuate an
adequate remedy is the court able to impose expansive prophylactic relief." Indeed, where the defendants fail to
fashion an adequate remedy or comply with their own plan,
the courts find a heightened need and stronger basis for
awarding prophylactic relief. 45 Accordingly, in the prison
case of Hutto v. Finney, the district court gave the prison
defendants two chances to devise their own plan for remedying the constitutional violations. 24 6' The defendants' failure to implement a remedial plan or to make any substantial progress on curing the harm then provided the basis for
the district court, and subsequently the Supreme Court, to
authorize prophylactic relief." 7 The Court held:
In fashioning a remedy, the District Court had ample authority to
go beyond earlier orders and to address each element contributing
to the violation. The District Court had given the Department
repeated opportunities to remedy the cruel and unusual conditions
in the isolation cells. If petitioners had fully complied with the
court's earlier orders, the present time limit might well have been
unnecessary. But taking the long and unhappy history of the
suggesting that any remedy for its violations of State law should be predicated
upon its long range plans for building a new 48 bed maximum security facility
and a new 300 bed facility, its position is untenable for several reasons.").
244. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971) ("Remedial judicial authority does not put judges automatically in the
shoes of the school authorities whose powers are plenary. Judicial authority enters only when local authority defaults."); see also William A. Fletcher, The
Discretionary Constitution:InstitutionalRemedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91

YALE L.J. 635, 695-97 (1982) (concluding that courts should supplant state and
local government only to the extent that those governments have demonstrated
that they cannot be trusted to remedy the wrong).
245. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 16 ("In default by the school authorities of their
obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad power to
fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school system."); id. at 24 (noting
that the school board had totally defaulted in its acknowledged duty to come
forward with an acceptable remedial plan of its own, despite the patient efforts
of the judge who on at least three occasions urged the board to submit plans).
246. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) ("After finding the conditions of
confinement unconstitutional, the District Court did not immediately impose a
detailed remedy of its own. Instead, it directed the Department of Correction to
,make a substantial start' on improving conditions and to file reports on its progress .... When the Department's progress proved unsatisfactory, a second
hearing was held .... Again the court offered prison administrators an opportunity to devise a plan of their own for remedying the constitutional violations,
but this time the court issued guidelines, identifying four areas of change that
would cure the worst evils.").
247. Id. at 687.
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litigation into account, the court was justified in entering a
order to insure against the risk of inadequate
comprehensive
2 48
compliance.

Second, courts carefully assess the viability of other alternative relief before crafting their own protective measures. 249 Prophylaxis is not generally the default remedial
decision. 2 "° Rather, it is commonly applied in an incremental
manner, with the judge at each step of the case adding
more specific measures as needed.25' Such incremental relief
is needed where defendants have evaded a prior, less-restrictive prohibitory injunction. For example, in the abortion protest case of Madsen, the trial court first enjoined the
defendant protestors from blockading or blocking access to
the abortion clinic. 53 When the defendants failed to comply
with that order, the court then crafted specific prophylactic
2
measures to address the facilitators of the harm. 1 Similarly, in the school desegregation cases, the Court first ordered the defendants to change the segregated school sys-

248. Id.
249. See Landsberg, supra note 2, at 930 (concluding that prophylactic rules
"provide a maximum remedy in cases where simple prohibitory rules are likely
to fail").
250. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 448, 504 (1974) (denying prophylactic
measure of prohibiting all state criminal prosecutions to remedy unconstitutional racially-motivated prosecutions because of "the availability of other
avenues of relief open to respondents for the serious conduct they assert,"
including recusal of the judge, change of venue, sanction of the judge, postconviction appellate review, or federal habeas relief); FIss, supra note 65, at 14
(describing the first decade of school desegregation remedies of the general
structural command giving way to the specific prophylactic remedies of the second Brown decade in which courts began writing specific plans to cope with the
absence of good faith on part of defendants to comply with the prior orders).
251. See, e.g., Justice Speech, supra note 14, 7-8.
252. See Fiss, supra note 65, at 36 (describing the gradualism of the conversion of a generalized structural injunction into a specific prophylactic order:
"The usual scenario in the structural context is for the judge to issue a decree
(perhaps embodying a plan formulated by the defendant), to be confronted with
disobedience, and then not to inflict contempt but to grant a motion for supplemental relief. Then the cycle repeats itself. In each cycle of the supplemental
relief process the remedial obligation is defined with greater and greater specificity.").
253. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So.2d 664, 667 n.4
(Fla. 1993), affd in part,rev'd in part sub nom. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr.,

Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
254. Id. at 669.
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tem2 55 and then to create a racially unified school system." 6

It was only when those two general orders failed to achieve
results that the courts turned to the specific prophylactic
2 57
measures of requiring busing, quotas, and redistricting.
Thus, the prior default of the defendant in failing to conform to a less restrictive injunction is a strong case for the
imposition of prophylactic relief.258
However, where the defendants have not violated prior
orders or laws, alternative less restrictive remedies should
be considered prior to the imposition of prophylactic measures. For example, in the school desegregation case of
People Who Care the court invalidated a prophylactic measure forbidding the school district from tracking students by
grouping students by ability.5 9 While there was some evidence that the school may have used tracking to segregate
white and black students, the court held that a lesser restrictive prophylactic measure was required.2

0

1

Thus, the

255. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 249, 301 (1955) (ordering preventive, structural relief requiring defendants to "admit to public schools on a
racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these
cases").
256. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (ordering reparative, structural relief requiring the defendants to "take whatever steps necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
eliminated root and branch").
257. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16, 26
(1971) (ordering prophylactic relief because of "the need for remedial criteria of
sufficient specificity to assure a school authority's compliance with its constitutional duty" and the court's broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure a
unitary school system "in default by the school authorities of their obligation to
proffer acceptable remedies").
258. See Fletcher, supra note 244, at 637. "[R]emedial discretion in institutional suits is inevitably political in nature" and therefore "presumptively
illegitimate" except when political bodies that should ordinarily exercise such
discretion are "seriously and chronically in default" in which case judicial discretion is a "necessary" and "legitimate" substitute. Id.
259. 111 F.3d 528, 536 (7th Cir. 1997).
260. Id. ("Were abolition of tracking the only means of preventing the school
district from manipulating the tracking system to separate races, it might be a
permissible remedy. It is not the only way-as we take the plaintiffs implicitly
to concede by accusing the school district of having placed white kids in higher
tracks, and black kids in lower tracks, without always complying rigorously
with objective criteria, such as scores on achievement tests. If that is the wrong,
the remedy is obvious: forbid the district, on pain of contempt if the prohibition
is flouted, to track students other than in accordance with criteria that have
been validated as objective and nonracist. This form of remedy is not only proportioned to the violation and duly respectful of the autonomy of educators in

358

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

court could forbid the district from tracking students other
than in accordance with criteria validated as objective and
non-racist, but could not impose a blanket prohibition on
the useful educational measure of tracking."'
The failure to use prophylaxis appropriately as a fallback rather than a remedial starting point ultimately leads
to claims of unfettered judicial activism as it did in Bush v.
Gore. 62 In the famous election case of 2000, the Supreme
Court reacted to the unconstitutional recount ordered by
the Florida Supreme Court by immediately imposing its
own prophylactic remedy in the form of a four-part process
for a state recount. 23 Then, finding that there was insufficient time actually to comply with these prophylactic measures, the Court halted any and all recounts in the election.
This quick and dramatic default to prophylactic
should be exrelief raised universal criticism 26 -which
pected when a court fails to follow a more cautious approach to imposing prophylactic relief. In Bush v. Gore, the
Supreme Court did not consider less restrictive alternatives
such as the preventive relief of prohibiting the arbitrary recount or the reparative relief of requiring the Florida court
to correct the infirmities of its unconstitutional recount.266
Instead, the Court jumped to its own control of the Florida
matters educational; it also requires less administrative supervision by the special master . . ").

261. Id. at 536.
262. See Thomas, ProphylacticRemedies, supra note 1, at 387-407.

263. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam). The Court ordered:
(1) the adoption of adequate statewide standards for determining what constitutes a "legal vote" after opportunity for argument; (2) practicable procedures to
implement the standards; (3) orderly judicial review of any disputed matters;
and (4) evaluation of the accuracy of vote tabulation equipment by the Florida
Secretary of State. Id.
264. Id.
265. See Ward Farnsworth, "To Do a Great Right, Do a Little Wrong".- A
User's Guide to Judicial Lawlessness, 86 MINN. L. REV. 227, 264 (2001)

(concluding that the Court's remedial decision was "lawless" in that it "lacked
an adequate legal foundation by traditional standards"); Michael W. McConnell,
Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 660 (2001)
(finding the Court's remedial decision "unsettling" and incorrect as a matter of
law); Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV 757, 767 (2001)

(calling the Bush v. Gore remedy a "blunder" and the most difficult part of the
opinion to defend on conventional legal grounds); Thomas, Prophylactic
Remedies, supra note 1, at 387-401 (arguing that the remedial decision in Bush
v. Gore was an abuse of discretion under applicable principles of equitable
relief).
266. See Thomas, ProphylacticRemedies, supra note 1, at 391-98.

2004]

THE PROPHYLACTIC REMEDY

359

election system without any evidence of the ineffectiveness
of other less restrictive alternatives.267
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, any court that
imposes a prophylactic remedy must assess the inherent
danger of prophylactic remedies of improperly restricting
legal conduct. The burden to the defendant from the injunctive relief is a typical factor used by courts in evaluating the
propriety and scope of injunctive relief.268 Courts want to
ensure that their own remedies do not restrict protected
conduct, cause economic waste, or otherwise create unfairness. For the courts recognize that defendants obviously
have an interest in continuing to engage in permissible
conduct without the restriction of the court. Thus, the
Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that in crafting injunctive remedies, courts owe special deference to public institutional defendants.269 Sometimes this deference results
in the invalidation of prophylactic measures.27 ° However,
the deference principle is not a prohibition on regulating legal conduct through prophylaxis."' Instead, the deference

267. Id.
268. To qualify for injunctive relief, courts must consider the undue burden
to the defendant from the imposition of the injunction. See DOBBS, supra note
59, at 228; LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 282-89. In the context of broad equitable
relief, the Supreme Court has reiterated that the interests of the defendants
must be given proper deference. See also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361-62
(1996).
269. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-79 (1976) ("When a plaintiff
seeks to enjoin the activity of a government agency, even within a unitary court
system, his case must contend with the 'well-established rule that the Government has traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the dispatch of its
own internal affairs.'") (citations omitted). See also Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498
U.S. 237, 248 (1991); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992) (local public
education); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (deferring to defendant prison
officials); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995) (importance of local control over public education).
270. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 448, 502 (1974) (denying injunction
prohibiting all state criminal prosecutions against plaintiffs to address harm of
racially-motivated state prosecutions on the basis that "such a major continuing
intrusion of the equitable power of the federal courts into the daily conduct of
state criminal proceedings is in sharp conflict with the principles of equitable
restraint which this Court has recognized in the decisions previously noted").
271. Although, Justices Scalia and Thomas perhaps would argue to the contrary that courts cannot regulate any institutional conduct other than the
primary conduct directly causing the harm. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 357 (1996)
(Scalia, J.) ("The remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy that
produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established."); id. at 385
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suggests a level of caution that serves to tailor and limit
rather than to preclude the prophylactic remedy.
The biggest threat from prophylactic remedies comes
from measures that restrict affiliated conduct that is not
only legal, but also protected behavior. For example, in the
abortion protest cases of Schenck and Madsen, the Court
parsed through the lower courts' prophylactic measures to
ensure that they did not unduly restrict legal conduct protected by the First Amendment.272 In both cases, the Court
struck down prophylactic measures that restricted not
merely legal conduct of the defendant protestors, but constitutionally-protected conduct under the First Amendment.273
Due to the heightened protection accorded the legal conduct, the Court in Madsen invalidated prophylactic measures such as a ban on signs and protests at private homes
and tailored other measures that were not necessary to
achieve the protection from harm.274 The Schenck trial court
subsequently attempted to fashion a prophylactic preliminary injunction to restrain the same type of abortion protesting while circumventing the problems identified in the
Madsen decree. 2" Again, though, the Supreme Court struck
down some prophylactic measures as overly restrictive of
defendants' legal and constitutionally protected conduct.276
While such prophylactic measures were appropriate given
(Thomas, J., concurring); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
272. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); cf. Thomas v. Chicago Park
Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002) (upholding constitutionality of municipal park
ordinance requiring individuals to obtain permit before conducting more-than50-person events: "The prophylaxis achieved by insisting upon a rigid, nowaiver application of the ordinance requirements would be far outweighed, we
think, by the accompanying senseless prohibition of speech (and of other
activity in the park) by organizations that fail to meet the technical requirements of the ordinance but for one reason or another pose no risk of the evils
that those requirements are designed to avoid.").
273. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 357; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 753.
274. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 771 (tailoring buffer zone to reach only clinic
rather than private property); id. at 773 (invalidating ban on images and signs
observable in clinic); id. at 775 (invalidating blanket ban on picketing at employee residents finding that narrower time, place or manner restriction would
have accomplished the desired result).
275. See Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y. v. Project Rescue W.N.Y., 799 F.
Supp. 1417 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
276. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 866-67 (striking down "floating buffer zones"
prohibiting protestors from approaching within fifteen feet of individuals).
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the volatility of the protest conflict, the measures were still
required to be carefully tailored so as not to impinge on the
protestors' legal rights to free speech.277
Thus, the reality of prophylaxis belies the scholarly spin
that such remedies are disrespectful of the institutional
concerns of public defendants. Instead, the case law demonstrates how prophylaxis is used only where necessary. Defendants are given the first opportunity to remedy that
harm. If a court remedy is required, the court carefully considers less restrictive remedial options other than prophylaxis. Once the court selects prophylaxis, it carefully tailors
each aspect of its prophylactic measures to respect the ability of the defendant to engage in legal conduct that facilitates harm. At each step of the remedial process, defendants are given priority in the creation and tailoring of the
prophylactic remedy. Such remedial favoritism in favor of
defendants, the wrongdoers, has led Professor Wendy
Parker to accuse the judicial system of ceding too much remedial _power to the defendants at the expense of plaintiffs'
rights.2 Thus, what is apparent from an examination of the
prophylactic measures that have withstood challenge is
that they restrict defendants' legal conduct only as a last
remedial resort. 9

277. Id. at 867 ("We have before us a record that shows physically abusive
conduct, harassment of the police that hampered law enforcement, and the tendency of even peaceful conversations to devolve into aggressive and sometimes
violent conduct.").
278. See Parker, supra note 18, at 479 (calling for courts to more carefully
define the right and recognize their own remedial abilities in order to counter
the current Supreme Court approach to school desegregation and public law
remedies that cedes too much remedial power to the defendants thereby
preventing lower court judges from undertaking principled, well-grounded public law remedies). See also Parker, supra note 79.
279. See FISS, supra note 65, at 13 ("With the structural injunction the story
is more complicated: over time the decreed act becomes more and more specific,
for example, detailing the dates on which choice forms are to be distributed, the
ratio of blacks and whites in each school, the amount to be spent on books, etc.
But this specificity emerges as a last resort. The original impulse in these structural cases was just the opposite-to use almost no specificity in describing the
act required.").
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B. Crafting Prophylaxis in the Remedial Decisionmaking
Process
A practical, yet important question is how the judge
formulates the specific measures that will constitute the
prophylactic remedy. The standard assumption is that
there is no process or criteria used to craft prophylaxis, but
rather that the decree results out of whole cloth based on
the judge's own personal view of how best to resolve the
case.28° Such perceived indeterminacy and arbitrariness
feeds the claims of the illegitimacy of prophylactic relief.
However, the reality is that the courts, in crafting prophylactic measures, simply employ the traditional adjudicatory
process and decisionmaking to make the remedial decision. The court conducts hearings, orders briefings, receives evidence, and appoints experts as necessary to
gather the facts relevant to deciding the remedial question
of what facilitators to address in prophylactic relief.282 The
prophylactic measures are not judge invented, but rather
280. See LASSER, supra note 8, at 222-43 (describing the Reagan-era criticisms of the Supreme Court cases involving desegregation, criminal procedure,
prisons, voting, etc. as a "jurisprudence of idiosyncrasy" unrestrained by anything but the judges' own policy preferences). See also Diver, supra note 12, at
62 ("First, a remedial decree is a complex and contingent exercise in prediction.
It calls for speculation about the behavior of individuals and human institutions
under conditions of unusual stress-judgments likely to be based more on 'feel,'
on the ineffable deposit of experience, than on objectively verifiable evidence.");
Justice Speech, supra note 14, at 7 ("Where I am most accused of activism is
with respect to the broad and comprehensive remedies that I have ordered in
institutional reform cases. Some say that I have usurped the power of the state
legislature, meddled in areas beyond the expertise of the court, and imposed my
own philosophy and sociological conclusions. I disagree wholeheartedly with
these allegations, and I would move to quash the indictment."); Mishkin, supra
note 71, at 960-65.
281. See Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller's Theory of Adjudication and the False
Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75
B.U. L. REV. 1273 (1995); Parker, supra note 79, at 1623. Cf. Theodore
Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in
InstitutionalLitigation, 93 HARv. L. REV. 465 (1980); Justice Speech, supranote
14, at 7 ("When properly practiced, remedial activism is completely consistent
with the obligation of a district court judge to determine the existence of constitutional injuries and impose appropriate remedies based upon the evidence adduced in the case.").
282. See Justice Speech, supra note 14, at 7 ("the adversarial nature of the
judicial process-particularly the consideration of the testimony of expert witnesses-enables the court to order remedies that are neither arbitrary, tyrannical, nor the products of its own imagination, but rather remedies that flow logically from the court's findings in the case.").
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judge incorporated from the existing record. As Judge
Justice of the Eastern District of Texas stated in describing
his process for adopting prophylactic and structural remedies in prison litigation cases: "I created none of this out of
whole cloth. Rather, the facts of the case and the testimony
of eminent experts supported the necessity of each and
every step to remedy the clearly established constitutional
' The important reality is that judges are limviolations."283
ited in crafting prophylactic relief to the evidence presented
in the record, and thus are generally precluded214from basing
these remedies on matters external to the case.
Academics, however, have missed the reality of the routine adjudication of remedies.8 5 Since the advent of prophylactic relief, it has been suggested by scholars that remedial decisionmaking of a public nature cannot be done
within the traditional adjudicatory process, but rather requires a specialized remedial process. 28 6 The assertion is
that legal claims pertaining to the broader public interest

283. Id. at 8-9.
284. See Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1124 (D. Del. 1977)
("Those same individuals testified housing classification becomes impeded unless eight to ten percent of the beds used for permanent housing of convicted
inmates are not occupied. Accordingly, the aggregate existing and future design
capacity of DCC will be reduced by eight percent to determine the maximum
capacity of DCC before classification to housing becomes impeded."); see also
Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 33, at 486 (discussing how judges imposing
prophylactic remedies are limited by the record built by the parties, evidentiary
rules, and the requirement to base its findings supporting prophylactic relief
upon the record).
285. See Bone, supra note 281, at 1275 (arguing that the dichotomy between
private and public law litigation has been mischaracterized and misunderstood); Parker, supra note 79, at 1627 (calling into serious question the public
law model of litigation in which the judge acts in an atypical, activist manner).
286. See Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79
GEO. L. J. 1355 (1991) (proposing a specialized deliberative process akin to mediation to resolve public law remedies); Diver, supra note 12, at 63 ("Adjudication is not well suited to such an enterprise. Its logic seeks to cast the multipolar, shifting relationships in institutions into a static and precisely defined
conflict. It looks for an optimal, comprehensive, and final solution rather than
an incremental, continual adjustment of interests. The adjudicatory model
demands objective verifiability, not instinctive feel. It treats institutions as
intelligent, organic actors capable of implementing rational objectives through
consistent patterns of behavior, and it relies on the invocation of authority and
the threat of coercive sanctions to induce changes in behavior."); Lon Fuller,
The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978) (arguing
that polycentric problems of public nature are not suit to resolution in the
bipolar legal dispute process).
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require a "consensus-based" process allowing participation
by multiple stakeholders and policy decisions that fall outside the judicial realm."' In other words, advocates argue
that public law solutions require alternative dispute resolution rather than traditional adjudication. 8 '
It is certainly true that crafting legal remedies is quintessential "problem solving" and thus effectively, and perhaps most effectively, can be done through Alternative
Dispute Resolution ("ADR").289 However, that is true in each
and every case: ADR allows parties in all cases to have selfdetermination, participation, knowledge, and result maximization that often is missing from the litigation process."'
The reality is that ADR does not always succeed. Parties
fail to reach a settlement, defendants fail to comply with an
agreement, or the plaintiff believes that a court judgment
can better protect her rights.292 In the absence of a private
agreement, judges are charged with crafting a remedy to
287. See Sturm, supra note 286, at 1357.
288. Id.; see also Molly Townes O'Brien, At the Intersection of Public Policy
and Private Process: Court-Ordered Mediation and the Remedial Process in
School Funding Litigation, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 391 (2003). But see
OWEN FIss, THE LAW AS IT COULD BE 90-104 (2003) (reprinting Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984), and arguing strongly against the use of
ADR to resolve public law litigation).
289. See Minow, supra note 9 (describing use of mediation, early neutral
evaluators); O'Brien, supra note 288, at 394 (arguing that Ohio school funding
case could best be resolved through a complex mediation process involving multiple stakeholders and occurring after the judicial determination of core rights).
290. See LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION
AND LAWYERS

2 (2d ed. 1997).

291. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000)
(failing to reach settlement through negotiation or court-ordered mediation
after liability determination finding that defendant corporation violated the antitrust laws).
292. See Judge Harry Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panaceaor
Anathema? 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 676 (1986) (stating there is "real reason for
concern" if ADR is extended to resolve difficult issues of constitutional or public
law by making use of non-legal values to resolve important social issues or
allow public officers to avoid their duties and obligations); Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073 (1984) (arguing that settlement is not
generally preferable to a judicial decision); Trina Grillo, The Mediation
Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L. J. 1545 (1991) (arguing
that mediation, and particularly mandatory mediation, is harmful to women in
divorce and domestic violence cases); Judith Resnick, Failing Faith:
Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 545 (1986) ("Adjudication is far from perfect. But what it offers is decisionmaking by governmentempowered individuals who have some accountability both to the immediate
recipients of the decisions and to the public at large.").
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respond to the established violation. Thus, ultimately,
courts must be able to formulate reasoned decisions as to
appropriate prophylactic relief in a given case.
In order to collect the information necessary to crafting
prophylactic relief, the court utilizes the same adjudicatory
process used in every case to determine questions of fact
and liability and remedies such as damages.293 Courts deciding whether and how to craft prophylactic relief rely
upon hearings, arguments, briefs, evidence witnesses and
experts to assess the relevant facts and law. 94 The remedial
decision is generally rendered following a bifurcated phase
of the trial devoted to hearing evidence and argument about
the remedial question whether the remedy sought is an injunction or damages. In chastising the Microsoft district
court for failing to conduct such a remedial hearing, the appellate court reiterated the important adjudicatory requirements of remedial decisionmaking:
The District Court's remedies-phase proceedings are a different
matter. It is a cardinal principle of our system of justice that
factual disputes must be heard in open court and resolved through
trial-like evidentiary proceedings. Any other course would be
contrary to the spirit which imbues our judicial tribunals
prohibiting decision without hearing. A party has the right to
judicial resolution of disputed facts not just as to the liability
phase, but also as to appropriate relief. Normally, an evidentiary
293. See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 101-02 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
("But a prediction about future events is not, as a prediction, any less a factual
issue."); United States v. Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62 (D.D.C. 2000), vacated
by 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Parker, supra note 79.
294. See Fletcher, supra note 244, at 656-57 (discussing the typical litigation
tools judges use to make an informed decision about issuing affirmative injunctions including testimony, hearings, special masters, intervenors, and amicus
briefs). For example, in Women Prisoners v. D.C. Dep't of Corrs., 877 F. Supp.
634 (D.D.C. 1994), this author, as one of the counsel for plaintiffs in the case,
presented evidence on the remedy issue though expert testimony, expert
reports, document evidence, and demonstrative evidence during the liability
phase of the trial.
295. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 365-66 (1997) (indicating trial court conducted twenty-seven days of hearings regarding compliance with temporary injunction and proper scope of preliminary relief); Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 7 (1971) (indicating district
court held numerous hearings and received voluminous evidence as to prophylactic remedy for school desegregation). See also Hart v. Comty. Sch. Bd. of
Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 769, 769-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); People Who Care v.
Rockford Bd of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 533 (7th Cir. 1997) (conducting designated
hearings for remedial phase of school desegregation case).
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hearing is required before an injunction may be granted.... Other
than a temporary restraining order, no injunctive relief may be
entered without a hearing. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. A
hearing on the merits-i.e., a trial on liability-does not substitute
for a relief-specific evidentiary hearing unless the matter of relief
was part of the trial on liability, or unless 29there
are no disputed
6
factual issues regarding the matter of relief.

In these supplemental remedial proceedings, the attorneys for the plaintiffs present their remedial demands and
the defendants present their denial or counter-demands for
appropriate relief.29 7 The plaintiffs initially frame the context of potential relief, often placing a particular remedy up
for debate or excluding a remedy from the range of potential
options. 29 8 Defendants present their own interests as to the
specific remedies proposed, including cost and implementation concerns. 299 Initially, these interests of the defendants
are given presumptive weight as the court gives the defendants the first opportunity to remedy the violation independently. °0 The parties' experts present evidence and tes296. United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See
Women Prisoners v. D.C. Dep't of Corrs., 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994) (in
which the evidentiary matters regarding the remedial issues where presented
during the liability phase of trial primarily by plaintiffs' experts).
297. See United States v. Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 61 (D.D.C. 2000)
("The Court has been presented by plaintiffs with a proposed form of final
judgment that would mandate both conduct modification and structural reorganization by the defendant when fully implemented. Microsoft has responded
with a motion for summary rejection of structural reorganization and a request
for months of additional time to oppose the relief sought in all other respects."),
vacated by 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
298. See Parker, supra note 79, at 1627 (describing how the parties initiate
the matters to be decided by the court in the remedial process).
299. E.g., Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 61 n.1 ("Microsoft's attorneys were
promptly able to tender a 35-page 'Offer of Proof,' summarizing in detail the
testimony 16 witnesses would give to explain why plaintiffs' proposed remedy,
in its entirety, is a bad idea."). The judge might also seek more information from
defendants other than those in direct control of the institution. See Davis v.
Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1198 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (cooperation of state governor and attorney general in suit directed at state mental hospital); Gates v.
Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 897 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (conference between court and
parties open to interested state and federal officials), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th
Cir. 1974).
300. See supra notes 238-43 and accompanying text (discussing procedural
requirement that defendants be given the first opportunity to draft remedial
plan or remedy the harm); Special Project, The Remedial Process in

InstitutionalReform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 797-99, 803 (1978) (de-

scribing the judicial practice of "remedial abstention" by which the court defers

2004]

THE PROPHYLACTIC REMEDY

367

timony about appropriate prophylactic relief by including
their industry expertise as to what measures are likely to
be successful in avoiding the harm."1
The court might then supplement the parties' presentations using commonly-available litigation tools. For example, the court might appoint a special master or a courtappointed expert to investigate the facts, conduct factfinding hearings, or to interview and consult with those
affected by the potential remedial decision. °2 The court
might allow intervention or permit- amicus briefs to be filed
in the case in order to obtain information from interested
third parties." 3 Further discovery on the remedial issues
to the defendants' creation of an injunctive remedy); Parker, supra note 79, at
1628 (criticizing the largely deferential stance of courts to defendants' preferences in crafting injunctive relief under which defendants are very likely to
win); e.g., United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 485 (W.D. Va. 1994)
(deferring to defendant's proposed remedial plan establishing separate military
schools for men and women), affd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 518 U.S.
515 (1996) (holding that remedy violated equal protection).
301. E.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 770 (1997) (supporting prophylactic measure of buffer zone with testimony of one of petitioners'
witnesses during evidentiary hearing); People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of
Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 534 (7th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging the utility of expert
testimony both at the liability and remedial stage of the lawsuit, but limiting
the expert testimony to properly admissible evidence in accordance with
Daubert); Women Prisoners v. D.C. Dep't of Corrs., 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C.
1994); Fletcher, supra note 244, at 657 (stating that the expert provides information regarding the remedial decision by testifying to a consensus among
members of his or her particular profession).
302. E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 8
(1971) (finding defendant's remedial plan unacceptable and appointing educational expert to prepare remedial plan for school desegregation); People Who
Care, 111 F.3d at 533 (referring remedial phase of school desegregation litigation to magistrate judge pursuant to the parties' consent who then appointed a
special master pursuant to FED. R. CIv. P. 53 to hear evidence relevant to the
remedy and craft a remedial plan); Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. Of Brooklyn, 383 F.
Supp. 769, 769-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (utilizing special master's work and proposed
remedial plan in developing court's own injunctive remedy). See Justice, supra
note 9, at 27 (describing the use of special masters to present "the viewpoints
about liability and remedy not otherwise likely to be expressed by the participants in the lawsuit"); Fletcher, supra note 236, at 656-57 (describing use of
special masters, magistrates, and experts in remedial process of institutional
injunctions); Special Project, supra note 296, at 805-09 (describing use of
masters and experts in remedial process and collecting case examples). But see
Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 930 (invalidating the use of a special officer as
part of the remedy itself to oversee and investigate future instances of sexual
harassment and assault in the women's prison).
303. E.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 11 (accepting remedial plan submitted by nonparty United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare); Fletcher,
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could be ordered.34 The judge might locate relevant reme-

dial precedent from other courts regarding the types of prophylactic measures ordered in similar cases." Alternatively, the judge might view for himself a location or other
key aspect of the case.
Once the court has sufficient informational inputs, it
must then engage in the remedial decisionmaking process
by which it selects and crafts the particular remedy."° This
remedial process essentially is judicial problem solving
through which the court determines the appropriate remedial solution by (1) identifying the interests of the parties,
(2) generating and evaluating options, and (3) separating
the people from the problem."08 The court must first

separate the people from the problem by remaining
impartial and not reacting to the personalities of the parties
or himself.319 Instead, the court bases the remedial solution

supra note 236, at 656-57; Justice, supra note 9, at 26-27 (describing the judicial
use of litigating amici to craft injunctive relief); Special Project, supra note 290,
at 804; see, e.g., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 63 F.R.D. 1
(N.D. Ala. 1974); Chance v. Bd. of Exam'rs, 330 F. Supp. 203, 207 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); see also Hart, 383 F. Supp. at 770 (summarizing the remedial phase of
the case in which "the court received communications from various groups and
persons affected").
304. Parker, supra note 79, at 1653 nn. 167-70 (collecting cases where judges
have ordered additional discovery to determine possible remedial measures).
305. Cf Swann, 402 U.S. at 27 ("The maps submitted in these cases graphically demonstrate that one of the principal tools employed by school planners
and by courts to break up the dual school system has been a frank-and sometimes drastic-gerrymandering of school districts and attendance zones.");
United States v. Microsoft Corp, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63 (D.D.C. 2000) ("The proposed final judgment is represented to the Court as incorporating provisions
employed successfully in the past."), vacated by 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
306. See Hart, 383 F. Supp. at 770 ("With the consent of the parties, the
court again viewed Coney Island and its environs.")
307. See Special Project, supra note 296, at 802 (describing the manner in
which judges select appropriate injunctive remedies); Justice Speech, supra
note 14, at 8 ("After almost a year of exhaustively reviewing the trial testimony
and the proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties, I ordered comprehensive relief coextensive with the wholesale constitutional violations.")
308. E.g., ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES 10-

12 (1981); Robert MacCrate, Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the
Profession:Narrowing the Gap, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO
BAR 138-40 (1992) (identifying problem solving as the first of ten fundamental
skills necessary for competency lawyering); see generally Minow, supra note 9
(describing Judge Weinstein's role as a problem solver in crafting public law
remedies).
309. Where the judge has failed to remain impartial and crafted injunctive
relief based on the people in the case, the remedy has been overturned. United
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on objective criteria such as legal principles, tangible data,
evidence, or other resources presented in the record. 3" The
court identifies the relevant interests of the parties
including practicality, fairness, retribution, or funding
readily identifiable from the evidence and briefs presented
by the parties.3 ' Finally, the court then generates possible
remedial options from the suggestions of the parties,
experts, evidence, or legal precedent. 2 Then, the court uses
traditional decisionmaking tools such as cost-benefit
analysis or balancing of the equities of fairness and social
justice to select from among the possible alternatives.1
This routine remedial process for imposing prophylactic
remedies conducted within the typical judicial proceedings
thus effectuates the norms valued in legitimate judicial
decisionmaking: participation, impartiality, and reasoned
decisions. 14
The court does not simply endorse its own preferred
moral agenda, but instead designs the prophylactic remedy
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 110-11, 118-19 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (vacating
structural and prophylactic relief ordered based in part on disqualification of
judge who based remedy on his own personal animosity towards defendant
Microsoft and its CEO, Bill Gates); see Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 61-62
(implying in rendering remedial decision that defendant failed to use good faith
in negotiations or in compliance with liability determination and accusing
defendant of being "untrustworthy" and "disingenuous").
310. See, e.g., Special Project, supra note 302, at 802.
311. E.g., id. at 803; Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 62-63 (weighing in favor of
plaintiffs' remedial proposal: "Plaintiffs won the case, and for that reason alone
have some entitlement to a remedy of their choice. Moreover, plaintiffs' proposed final judgment is the collective work product of senior antitrust law
enforcement officials of the United States Department of Justice and the
Attorneys General of 19 states, in conjunction with multiple consultants. These
officials are by reason of office obliged and expected to consider-and to act inthe public interest; Microsoft is not.").
312. E.g., Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 769, 770-71
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (considering three remedial plans submitted by the defendants,
the special master, and the plaintiffs' expert); Special Project, supra note 302,
at 802 ("Judicial selection of the systemic remedy, after receipt of suggestions
from all the parties, is a common alternative to judicial imposition of a remedy
or judicial non-involvement in remedy formulation. A court seeking the participation of the parties in remedy formulation first solicits their ideas, plans, and
supporting information, and then either accepts one suggested plan in toto or
devises its own plan out of the several proposals.").
313. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 9, at 5, 13-17 (describing the decisionmaking process of the court in prison litigation cases involve identifying a range
of alternatives and selecting the best option using a cost-benefit analysis).
314. Sturm, supra note 286, at 1435-36; see also Fuller, supra note 286, at
365-66, 372.

370

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

to conform to the evidence presented at trial and the judicial precedents. Again, as Judge Justice described:
[Tihe determination results from the application of judicial
precedents and factual reality, which the adversarial process is
designed to foster. Simply ordering the Texas prison to hire more
prison guards based purely on my personal opinion would have
been both an arbitrary and an arrogant use of power. Every aspect
of the relief that I ordered was based on the evidence presented in
my court.315

The prophylactic remedy must be justified through a
reasoned decision in which the court supports the particular
remedy with evidence in the record. If the judge fails to follow the adjudicatory process and conform the remedy to the
factual findings, the injunction is subject to reversal as it
was in Lewis v. Casey.3 As the concurring Justices emphasized, the problem with the broad prison library injunction
was its "overreaching of the evidentiary record" in ordering
relief that was not justified or even supported by the factual
findings in the case. 17 Thus, courts are limited to reacting
to the legal problem as presented to it and are constrained
by the particular application to crafting prophylactic remedies within the confines of that case presentation.
III. THE NECESSITY OF PROPHYLACTIC REMEDIES
Courts consistently resort to prophylactic remedies because they are necessary to providing effective relief to

315. Justice Speech, supra note 14, at 10.
316. 518 U.S. 343, 359 (1996).
317. Id. at 393-94, 397-98 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
318. Justice Speech, supra note 14, at 9 ("Furthermore, even in a so-called
public law institutional reform case, the judge is still constrained by certain
hallmarks of judicial decisionmaking: (1) the judge must make a decision on
every grievance presented; (2) the judge must listen to the witnesses and arguments of both sides; and (3) the judge must justify his decision. These safeguards-which, I emphasize, are not imposed on state legislators and executive
officers, who also make decisions profoundly affecting the welfare of the
community-make it more likely that a judge's decision regarding the remedy
to be imposed will be reliable and well- considered."); cf. Hamilton &
Schoenbrod, supra note 33, at 487 (explaining that Section 5 remedies are more
powerful than typical judicial constitutional remedies because Congress can apply the remedy across the board to others outside the context of the case).
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plaintiffs.319 Other remedies both injunctive and monetary
are unable to provide meaningful relief to plaintiffs who
have proven a violation of important, but often intangible,
rights. 2 ' The prophylactic remedy fulfills this remedial need
by providing a judicial mechanism to address the definitional and functional inadequacies of other remedies.
Yet the construct of prophylaxis that continues to
dominate legal thinking is that of a remedy that gives
plaintiff more than she needs or deserves thereby "overprotecting" legal rights."' While Professor Schoenbrod explained twenty years ago how prophylaxis does not in fact
give something extra,32 but rather gives the plaintiff precisely what she is entitled to by extra measures, the
question persists as to the real necessity for prophylactic
relief. For example, in the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
targeted attacks on structural and prophylactic relief intended to eliminate the use of prophylactic remedies by requiring that any prospective relief imposed by a federal
court be "necessary" to correcting a constitutional violation.3 23 The implication is that prophylactic relief is not necessary to vindicate legal rights.
As previously discussed, however, prophylactic remedies are important-and indeed integral-to interpreting
and implementing legal rights.324 The prophylactic remedy
uniquely is able to translate abstract rights into meaningful
relief. 2 ' Its measures exemplify the right, thereby defining
319. Monaghan, supra note 15, at 21; Landsberg, supra note 2, at 965;
Justice, supra note 9, at 9.
320. Alternative injunctive remedies are often ineffective because they are
vague or avoidable. Damages are ineffective because the loss of intangible
rights is difficult to measure in monetary terms, see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247 (1978), or difficult to collect from immune state defendants, see U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
321. See supra note 123, accompanying text, and sources cited. The notion of
prophylaxis as overprotecting legal rights was first put forth by Henry
Monaghan who advocated in favor of such rules and remedies. See Monaghan,
supra note 15, at 21 ("A prophylactic rule might be constitutionally compelled
when it is necessary to overprotect a constitutional right because a narrow,
theoretically more discriminating rule may not work in practice.").
322. See Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 671; see also supra note 136 and accompanying text.
323. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2000).
324. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
325. Levinson, supra note 71, at 874 ("The definition of most or all rights
incorporates 'remedial' prophylactic rules."); Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra
note 33, at 692 (explaining that "[prophylactic] remedies are used by courts to
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the right in a way that allows it to become cognitively tangible. In addition, the prophylactic remedy has the capacity
to effectively implement the right through the use of its
specific directives. 26 The unique functional abilities of the
prophylactic remedy to counter the defendant's resistance
to compliance, provide precise notice to the defendant of expected conduct, and facilitate the court's oversight make it
a particularly effective choice to enforce intangible rights.327
A. DefinitionalNeed to TranslateAbstract Rights
The unique capability of the prophylactic remedy to
translate abstract rights into tangible meaning is perhaps
its greatest asset. 2 s The intangible rights at issue in the
prophylactic remedies cases present challenges to the court
as to how to translate those rights into tangible meaning.329
These cases all involve issues of paramount importance due
to the priority of the attendant right, the nature of public
law litigation, or the threat to personal liberty.33 ° Yet the
vagueness of traditional injunctive remedies prevents the
court from conveying to the parties a tangible reality of the
operative right.
For example, traditional equitable remedies for race
discrimination might order the defendant to "stop discriminating," or to "not discriminate against the plaintiff in the
future."33 1 These commands are too vague even for the wellprovide a tangible and workable definition to the otherwise amorphous constitutional proscription...").
326. See infra Part III.B.
327. See id.
328. Cf Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 33, at 687-95 (describing how
remedies generally are unified with the right so that the remedies define the
meaning of the substantive guarantee); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance,
92 YALE L. J. 585, 587 (1983) (stating that remedies generally "give meaning to
ideals" in order that they "be effective in the real world").
329. Justice, supra note 9, at 1 ("The values that we find in our Constitution ... are ambiguous. They are capable of a great number of different meanings ....There is a need-a constitutional need-to give them specific meaning,
to give them operational content. .. ").
330. See Thomas, ProphylacticRemedies, supra note 1, at 389-90.
331. See, e.g., Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1202 (11th Cir.
1999) (denying as too broad appellants' request for an injunction to stop discriminating on the basis of race in all its annexation decisions); Payne v.
Travenol Labs., Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1978) (reversing on specificity
grounds the District Court's injunction, which prohibited defendants from discriminating on the basis of color, race, or sex in employment practices).
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intentioned defendant-what does it mean to stop discriminating? What must the defendant do or not do?... For example, in Hughey v. JMS Development Corp.,333 the trial court's
injunction stated: "[Defendant shall] not discharge stormwater into the waters of the United States from its development property... if such discharge would be in violation
of the Clean Water Act.""3 4 The appellate court vacated the
injunction due to the inability of it or the defendant to determine what the injunction meant: "Was JMS supposed to
stop the rain from falling? Was JMS to build a retention
pond to slow and control discharges? Should JMS have constructed a treatment plan to comply with the requirements
of the CWA?"335 Indeed, courts routinely invalidate such
broad "obey the law" injunctions that fail to provide the defendant with a clear directive.33 And defendants often ig332. CF & I Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 507 F.2d 170 (10th
Cir. 1974) (holding that injunctive decree is vague when the delineation of the
proscribed activity lacks particularity, or when it contains only an abstract conclusion of law rather than an operative command capable of enforcement); see
Parker, supra note 18, at 514 (1999) ("Knowing that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from establishing 'separate but equal' schools based on
race tells us little about the nature of the right. What does it mean to be free
from racial discrimination in public schools? Do children have a right to attend
an integrated school; or a more limited right to attend an integrated school to
the extent feasible using the students within the school district lines; or an even
more limited right to attend schools with race-neutral attendance zones? In
addition, does the right include anything other than student assignment?")
(citation omitted). See also Justice Speech, supra note 14, at 7 ("If a decree is
only in general terms, such a defendant will find it easy to disobey and defy the
decree without fear of contempt, by making the contention that the order is too
vague to guide future conduct.").
333. 78 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996).
334. Id. at 1524.
335. Id. at 1531.
336. LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 236; JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING
REMEDIES 290 (1999). E.g., Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of
Health and Rehab Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1223 (11th Cir. 2000) ("The preliminary injunction in this case differs little from an 'obey the law' order because it
fails to identify with adequate detail and precision how Defendants are to
perform such critical obligations as 'adequately reimbursing providers of care'
and 'complying with the substantive requirements of the Medicaid Act.");
Burton, 178 F.3d at 1201 (dismissing plaintiffs discrimination claim because of
lack of any remedy to redress harm because the injunction sought by appellants
"would do no more than instruct the City to 'obey the law'"); Keyes v. Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 895 F.2d 659, 668 n.5 (10th Cir. 1990) (invalidating as vague a provision
of an injunction in school desegregation cases stating: "The duty imposed by the
law and by this interim decree is the desegregation of schools and the maintenance of that condition. The defendants are directed to use their expertise and
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nore such commands and continue to do business as
usual. 37 Legalistic guarantees against "discrimination,"
"pollution," or "unconstitutional action," standing alone are
abstract in meaning.
Prophylactic measures correct this void by translating
the abstract right by exemplification. 38 The tangible measures of prophylaxis exemplify the meaning of the right in
the specific case context."' Explanation by example is a
common way to understand a concept by illustrating its
meaning rather than using a synonym, antonym or description. For example, the meaning of "hot" could be illustrated
by the examples of a fire, stove, 40 or chili pepper 341 rather
than describing it as the "opposite of cold" or "capable of
3 42 Similarly, prophylactic
burning" or "giving off heat."

measures provide tangible illustrations of the meaning of

resources to comply with the constitutional requirement of equal education
opportunity for all who are entitled to the benefits of public education in
Denver, Colorado."); Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 898 (5th Cir.
1978) (refusing to enforce injunction that prohibited "discrimination"); see also
Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 10, 125-26 (1948)
(overturning injunction prohibiting monopolization). But see Ennels v. Ala. Inns
Assocs., 581 F.Supp. 708, 709-10 (M.D. Ala. 1984) (affirming injunction prohibiting defendant's "discrimination in admitting or serving blacks" rather than
requiring the enumeration of specific practices because of "[mian's ingenuity in
devising methods to discriminate 'in offering or serving' black patrons is infinite.").
337. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976)
(explaining defendant school board's argument in motion for contempt that its
inaction was due to the fact that it never understood what the injunction meant
prohibiting "no majority of any minority" schools).
338. Levinson, supra note 71, at 885 ("[T]he definition of a right may effectively incorporate a remedy, most commonly the equivalent of a prophylactic,
preventive injunction.").
339. See Justice, supra note 9, at 50 ("The Constitution does not say anything about reports, showers, or isolation cells; much less does it say anything
about the date reports are due, the temperature of showers, or the maximum
number of days that can be spent in an isolation cell. But it does say something
about equality and humane treatment, and a court trying to give meaning to
those values may find it both necessary and appropriate-as a way of bringing
the organization within the bounds of the Constitution-to issue directives on
these matters.").
340. See definitions of "hot," available at http://www.dictionary.com (citing
WEBSTER'S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1998)); WordNet 1.6, Princeton
University (1997)) (last visited Apr. 13, 2004).
341. See id. (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 41,
available at http://www.bartleby.com).
342. Id.
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the abstract right.343 For example, to describe what it means
to not "discriminate" in the workplace, the court might
choose a synonym prohibiting a "hostile environment," an
antonym requiring "equal opportunity" or a contextual description of prohibiting discrimination "in the hiring and
promotion of employees."344 Alternatively, the court might
illustrate the right to be free of gender discrimination by
example through prophylactic measures directing anti-harassment policies, pornography-free workspace, and education of employees. In this way, the prophylactic remedy exemplifies the legal guarantee, clearly and comprehensively
conveying the content of the right.
Prophylaxis translates rights, but does not itself transubstantiate into an independent right.3 45 The prophylactic
remedy does not convert the measure into a new right.346
However, prophylaxis is commonly misperceived as the judicial creation of a new right. 47 This "remedial incorporation," by which the remedy seems to become a part of the
right, is prevalent with prophylactic remedies.348 The specificity of prophylactic measures provides a tangible measure
to grasp when trying to effectuate the legal guarantees in
real life, and thus often the remedy takes on the mirage of
its own right. 49 For example, in the prison context the prophylactic measure of a law library to facilitate the right of
prisoner access to the courts seemed to evolve into a right in
343. E.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Women
Prisoners v. D.C. Dep't of Corrs., 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994).
344. E.g., Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 1999);
Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 565 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1978).
345. Contra Levinson, supra note 71, at 857.
346. Thomas, ProphylacticRemedies, supra note 1, at 381-84. Cf New York
v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (declaring that Miranda's prophylactic
measures "are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution. . .
(quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
347. Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra note 1, at 362; Grano, supra
note 7, at 101-06 ("What distinguishes a prophylactic rule from a true constitutional rule is the possibility of violating the former without actually violating
the Constitution. A decision that promulgates or employs a prophylactic rule
will not attempt to demonstrate an actual violation of the defendant's constitutional rights under review."); Klein, supra note 22, at 1032 (defining "prophylactic rule" as a legal requirement that "may be triggered by less than a showing
that the explicit rule was violated. ... ").
348. Levinson, supra note 71, at 899-904 ("[Rlemedial incorporation means
defining a constitutional right prophylactically to forbid at least some laws or
policies that would be permissible if considered in isolation.").
349. Thomas, ProphylacticRemedies, supra note 1, at 382-83.
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itself.35 ° Similarly, in the right to counsel context, the
Anders brief process for withdrawing from representation
became a new right in practice.351 And in the desegregation
context, prophylactic measures addressing housing segregation seemed to transubstantiate into the right against de
facto segregation.352
However, the courts have strictly blocked this definitional expansion of the substantive guarantee. In Lewis v.
Casey, the Court struck down structural and prophylactic
relief redressing inadequacies in the prison law library because there was no right to a library per se.3"3 Instead, the
library was merely a prophylactic measure designed in the
prior case of Bounds v. Smith to ensure the plaintiffs' rights
of access to the court.354 Similarly, in Smith v. Robbins, the
Court went to great lengths to explain that the Anders procedure is simply a prophylactic process to protect against
" Thus, a plainthe denial of counsel and not a right itself.35
tiff could not sue for the failure to comply with the Anders
procedure, and the State of California could create substitute measures to protect the right to counsel.356 In the desegregation cases, the Court repeatedly has affirmed that
the equal protection right itself extends only to de jure seg-

350. Id. at 385 (discussing phenomenon of remedial incorporation in prison
library cases). Compare Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (imposing prophylactic measure of prison law library) with Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 34849, 351 (1996) (rejecting as insufficient a cause of action based on failure to
provide adequate law library). See also Levinson, supra note 71, at 878-82
(discussing remedial incorporation generally in prison condition cases).
351. Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra note 1, at 385 (discussing
remedial incorporation in context of withdrawal of counsel). Compare Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (requiring counsel to prepare brief advising
court of lack of merit of appeal before withdrawing from case in order to prevent
harm from denial of counsel) with Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000)
(holding that Anders procedure is not required right itself).
352. Levinson, supra note 71, at 874-77 (describing how the remedies in
school desegregation cases seemed to redefine the right from prohibition of de
jure segregation to prohibition of de facto segregation).
353. 518 U.S. at 351 (1996) ("Because Bounds did not create an abstract,
freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's law library or
legal assistance is subpar in some theoretical sense.").
354. Id.
355. Smith, 528 U.S. at 273.
356. Id. at 265, 272-74, 286-88.
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regation. 5 ' Prophylactic remedies may redress de jure segregation by reaching the de facto contributors of that harm,
but they may not address de facto segregation in the absence of a constitutional violation.358
The import of these cases is clear: prophylactic remedies are not rights. This means first, that plaintiffs may not
base their lawsuit on the violation of the prophylaxis.5 9
Litigants may not sue for the mere denial or inadequacy of
a prophylactic measure itself.6 ° Only the plaintiffs in the
original case may sue for contempt if a defendant fails to
comply with ordered prophylactic measures.36 ' Plaintiffs in
external actions must base their cause of action on the attendant constitutional, statutory, or common law right.6 2
While prophylactic remedies help explain the attendant
right, they do not function as an independent right themselves.
Prophylactic remedies have served as interpretative
shorthand for finding a legal violation in subsequent
cases. 36 3 While some have viewed this as evidence of prophylaxis converting to a right,364 its shorthand use is merely
the result of the regular operation of legal precedent in subsequent cases.365 Courts utilize the remedial decision with
respect to prophylaxis to inform their decisions on liability
and remedies in subsequent, unrelated cases. For example,
if X, Y, and Z have been adopted as prophylactic measures
to remedy a constitutional violation in other cases, then the
357. E.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464-65 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S.
406, 420 (1977).
358. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman 433 U.S.
406 (1977); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v.
Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435 (1976).
359. Thomas, ProphylacticRemedies, supra note 1, at 383.
360. See, e.g., Smith, 528 U.S. at 265; Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351
(1996). Cf Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288-89 (2001) (denying claim
brought for failure to comply with administrative agency's prophylactic
measure rather than for discrimination).
361. The prophylactic remedy as a type of injunctive relief acts in personam
upon the defendant and requires compliance under threat of contempt. SHOBEN
& TABB, supra note 1, at 246; LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 237-38.
362. E.g., Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350-52.
363. Thomas, ProphylacticRemedies, supra note 1, at 382.
364. See Klein, supra note 22, 1035-37.
365. Thomas, ProphylacticRemedies, supra note 1, at 382-83 (explaining in
depth how prophylactic remedies operate as precedent in subsequent cases).
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absence of those actions by a defendant may suggest inferentially that harm was not prevented, i.e. that a violation
occurred. 66 Conversely, the prophylactic remedy may operate as a safe harbor for defendants in subsequent, unrelated cases, allowing them to demonstrate their good faith
or lack of contribution to the violation of law.36 7 This is because showing that an alleged wrongdoer took measures
known to avoid harm suggests circumstantially that it is
not at fault for any resulting harm."8 Thus, prophylactic
remedies are useful legal precedent to decide similar cases
in the future. However, the line of precedential use is
crossed when litigants assert a right to the prophylaxis
itself.
The conclusion that prophylaxis is not a right itself
evaporates decades of misguided criticism of prophylactic
relief.369 Courts are not creating new rights through prophylaxis, but rather, are interpreting the legal right by example. The courts are choosing the remedial measures necessary to translate the abstract rights into accessible and
practical meaning. The practical meaning conveyed by orders directing defendants' conduct falls within the common,
accepted power of the court to interpret legal rights and
craft equitable relief.3 7' Therefore, as the emerging consen366. Thus, prophylactic remedies entered in a case sometimes serve as detection standards for violations in subsequent cases. See id. at 383, 386;
Caminker, supra note 15, at 1-2; Klein, supra note 22, at 1037.
367. Klein, supra note 22, at 1033, 1044 ("[A] '... safe harbor rule' is a judicially created procedure, that if properly followed by the government actor,
insulates the government from argument that the constitutional right was violated."). E.g., Kolstad v. Am. Dental Assoc., 527 U.S. 526, 528 (1999)
(establishing a safe harbor for employers against imposition of punitive damages for sexual harassment through compliance with prophylactic measures of
adoption of anti-harassment policies).
368. E.g., Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 528; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775 (1998) (identifying affirmative defense for defendant employer who promulgates anti-harassment policy and complaint procedure as demonstrating reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment).
369. Thomas, ProphylacticRemedies, supra note 1, at 382.
370. See id. at 376-82 (exploring the judicial remedial power to impose prophylactic remedies); Strauss, supra note 15, at 204-08 (explaining the legitimacy of prophylaxis as just one type of ubiquitous interpretive rule); Caminker,
supra note 15, at 2, 7, 22 (arguing prophylaxis is "straightforward exercise of
[legitimate] judicial power to interpret" rights). Cf Monaghan, supra note 15, at
2-3, 21-23 (grounding the legitimacy of judicial prophylaxis in the court's "constitutional common law" authority to impose implementing rules of "substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority
from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions").
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sus seems to acknowledge, there is nothing shocking or
even questionable about the use of prophylactic relief.37'
B. FunctionalNeed to Implement Rights
Prophylactic remedies are also needed to ensure the
implementation of the right.17' All remedies function instrumentally to implement the descriptive right. 7 3 Yet prophylactic remedies particularly help address hurdles to effective implementation caused by general orders that
facilitate confusion and resistance by defendants.374 Prophylactic relief counters the lack of compliance with an adjudicated right and its instrumental remedy by (1) avoiding
the defendants' resistance to the right by mandating specific change, (2) providing clear notice to the defendants of
expected behavior, and (3) ensuring the practical enforcement of the order by the court.
As Professor Gewirtz explained twenty years ago in his
classic piece, Remedies and Resistance, specific remedial decrees permit the court to address the defendants' resistance
on both philosophical and practical levels. 37 ' The specific
measures eliminate the defendants' discretion to avoid the
practical change necessary to implement the right, thereby
ensuring a higher level of remedial effectiveness. Gewirtz

371. See Thomas, ProphylacticRemedies, supra note 1, at 363-70; Caminker,
supra note 15, at 25; Dorf & Friedman, supra note 15, at 73 n.47; Landsberg,
supra note 2, at 976.
372. SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 679; Justice, supra note 9, at 1-2; Fallon,
supra note 22, at 137-39.
373. LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 1; Gewirtz, supra note 328, at 587 ("The
function of a remedy is to 'realize' a legal norm, to make it a 'living truth.'"). See
generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111
HARV. L. REv. 54, 57 (1997) ("A crucial mission of the court is to implement the
Constitution successfully.... The Court's role in implementing the Constitution... is the central focus of this forward.").
374. Monaghan, supra note 15, at 21 (arguing that prophylaxis might be
required where "there is a substantial danger that a more finely tuned rule may
be subverted in its administration by unsympathetic courts, juries, or public officials.").
375. See Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 679 (awarding prophylactic relief is
necessary to ensure the effective enforcement of the right by the court and to
achieve compliance from resistant defendants who could take advantage of the
uncertainty in more general orders).
376. Gewirtz, supra note 328, at 587.
377. Id.
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demonstrated his point using the desegregation cases.37 In
some cases, the school defendants resisted the declared
right to be free from segregation. 379 By imposing specific relief, the courts countered this resistance to the right by
mandating specific action rather than requiring defendants
to act against a strong philosophical disbelief.3 ° In other
cases, the defendants' resistance was to the practical externalities of the remedy such as the imposition of financial
costs or assumption of unpopular social obligations like
student busing. 1 The specificity of prophylactic measures
378. Id. at 587-88, 609 (addressing the problem of white resistance to
desegregation evidenced by white flight from public schools, violence, boycotts,
hostility, and foot-dragging).
379. Id. at 588 (describing the relentless and persistent failure of defendants to accept change and act in good faith); id. at 593 n.16 ("Criticism of a
remedy, therefore, may reflect criticism of the underlying right."); Frank
Easterbrook, The Limits of Judicial Power in Ordering Remedies: Civil Rights
and Remedies, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 103 (1991) ('When we hear an
objection to the remedy, it is almost always a disguised objection to the definition of what is due, and not to the methods used to apply the balm."); see also
Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13 (1971) (describing
the sixteen years of deliberate resistance and lack of good faith implementation
of Court's mandate in Brown to end segregation).
380. Justice Speech, supra note 14, at 9 ("Morales illustrates an old adage: If
you are confronted with a refractory mule, in order to get its attention, you need
to hit it-hard-right between the eyes. In Morales, the recalcitrant state institution was stimulated to action by the attention-getting, detailed, remedial
order."); id. at 9-10 (describing prophylactic relief issued in Ruiz v. Estelle, 503
F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980): "I ordered relief which has been justly described
as 'more comprehensive and specific than any other prison order ever issued by
a federal court.' The relief included details as specific as the amount of exercise
to be permitted to inmates, the number of guards assigned to a unit, and the
space allowance for prisoners housed in dormitories. The specificity to the order
resulted from the truly active and fanatical opposition of the defendants in the
pre-trial, trial, and post-trial phases of the case.").
381. See Gewirtz, supra note 328, at 599-601; e.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 15-29;
DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 2002) (DeRolph IV) (defendant resisting
order to fix and "overhaul" state system of funding public education on grounds
of lack of funds and aversion to raising taxes). The Ohio Supreme Court's failure to impose prophylactic remedies in the school funding case, DeRolph IV,
demonstrates the defendants' ability to evade compliance when they fail to
accept the legitimacy of the adjudicated right or the ordered remedy. In
DeRolph I in 1997, the Supreme Court declared the state's funding system for
public education unconstitutional under the Ohio Constitution's guarantee of a
thorough and efficient education and ordered a total "overhaul" of the system.
677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997). Yet the state took no action to change the funding
system. It repeatedly appealed to the Court on philosophical and practical reasons (lack of funds), and each time the Court reaffirmed its holding. DeRolph v.
State (DeRolph H), 678 N.E.2d 886 (1997); DeRolph v. State (DeRolph III), 754
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transfers the onus of the remedial obligations from the defendants to the court, thereby deflecting the political fallout
from unpopular change.382 Thus by the time of Swann v.
Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education, the Court recognized that its general commands of eliminating segregation were ineffective at preventing unconstitutional treatment.13 It therefore adopted in Swann prophylactic measures of busing, ratios, and gerrymandered attendance zones
proactively to counter the defendants' resistance to the
practice of constitutionally-required desegtheory and
384
regation.
Federal judge William Justice similarly described his
rationale for imposing prophylactic relief in institutional
cases to counter the defendants' resistance:
[I]t should be emphasized that when confronted with an obstinate,
obdurate and unregenerate defendant, a more detailed remedy is
needed. If a decree is only in general terms, such a defendant will
find it easy to disobey and defy the decree without fear of
contempt, by making the contention that the order is too vague to
guide future conduct. In such instances, a court must "ratchetdown" on the defendant, by successive, more detailed
supplemental decrees, until compliance is eventually achieved.
Therefore, I firmly believe that when a defendant exhibits a
stubborn and perverse resistance to change, extensive courtordered relief is both necessary and proper.

The same need for assurances of effectiveness against
the defendants' resistance can be found in the abortion protest cases of the mid-1990s. 38 6 In those cases, the defendant
N.E.2d 1184 (2001); DeRolph !V,780 N.E.2d 529. However, the Court never
imposed specific prophylactic measures nor imposed contempt penalties to
counter the defendants' resistance. Instead, a worn-down, and differently
constituted Supreme Court finally issued a writ of prohibition freezing all relief
in the case. See State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 2003).
382. E.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 15-29; Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51-52
(1990) (upholding order to enjoin state tax collection authorities from denying
adequate budget to school district needed to remedy segregation). Indeed in
Missouri v. Jenkins, the school defendant itself became essentially a plaintiff
seeking to garner the court's power to effectuate change that the school itself
admitted was required, but was blocked by financial, social, and political opposition. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 18, at 487-88, 495.
383. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 15-29.
384. See id. at 22-30.
385. Justice Speech, supra note 14, at 7.
386. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
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protestors resisted the rights of the plaintiffs to choose
abortions and resisted court orders to stop blocking those
abortions.387 Indeed, in both cases, the court had documentation of the defendants' resistance. 88 In Madsen v.
Women's Health Center, the protestors had repeatedly disobeyed a prior injunction issued by the judge prohibiting
them from "blockading and denying access to the clinic."3
In Schenck, the abortion protestors had violated a temporary restraining order prohibiting their blockading, and had
engaged in similar illegal behavior at other times, thereby
demonstrating their propensity to violate a general preventive order.390 The specific, objective measures gave the defendants in both cases less room for avoidance with the
declared right of the plaintiffs and thus facilitated the
3 91
greatest possible level of effectiveness of the court's order.
At a second level, prophylactic relief ensures the practical enforcement of the right by providing the defendant
with clear notice of expected behavior. 9 For example, by
specifying that prohibiting discrimination means establishing corporate anti-discrimination policies, procedures,
and training, the court avoids confusion and uncertainty on
the part of defendants.9 3 The certainty gives defendants the
387. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 365; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 758.
388. See Schenck, 519 U.S. 365-66; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 758. Similarly, in
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), the Court similarly supported the validity
of the prophylactic remedy on the basis of the need to counter the prison
defendants' "long and unhappy history" of unconstitutional prison conditions.
Id. at 687. The unconstitutional conditions in the Arkansas prison system characterized by the district court as "a dark and evil world completely alien to the
free world" had persisted for decades. Id. In the specific litigation phase in
Hutto itself, the conditions found to be unconstitutional remained uncured for
at least three years. See id. at 684.
389. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 758.
390. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 365, 368, 380.
391. See Gewirtz, supra note 328, at 596 (explaining that while no remedial
methods can guarantee success, a judge can reduce the risk of ineffectiveness by
imposing prophylactic measures such as monitoring compliance, issuing specific
decrees, and requiring specific procedures and programs).
392. Justice, supra note 9, at 50 ("[W]hen specificity is present, it can
usually be traced to considerations of efficacy and sometimes to general
considerations of fairness (such as notice).").
393. Id. ("The court may also find it necessary and appropriate to be quite
specific in these directives, either as a way of minimizing the risk of evasion or
as a way of helping the bureaucratic officers know what is expected of them.");
Cf. Int'l. Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Phila. Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 76
(1967) ("We do not deal here with a violation of a court order by one who fully
understands its meaning but chooses to ignore its mandate. We deal instead

2004]

THE PROPHYLACTIC REMEDY

383

freedom to continue their routine business practices without inhibition or fear that such conduct might violate an
existing injunction. 94 Moreover, the certainty of prophylactic measures protects defendants against exposure to contempt punishment for violating a vague or confusing order."' This advantage provided by the prophylactic remedy
of certainty is in fact a requirement of valid injunctive relief.39 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and the corresponding common law rules mandate the protection of defendants' rights by specific injunctions.397 The courts
emphasize that specific injunctions are required to provide
defendants with information as to what is required so as to
with acts alleged to violate a decree that can only be described as unintelligible.
The most fundamental postulates of our legal order forbid the imposition of a
penalty for disobeying a command that defies comprehension. Reversed.");
Meyer v. Brown & Root Const. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1981). ("An
injunction must simply be framed so that those enjoined will know what
conduct the court has prohibited.") (quoting Int'l. Longshoremen's Ass'n, 389
U.S. at 76).
394. See Public Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Patch, 167 F.3d 15, 29 (1st Cir. 1998)
("The Commission claims that it is unsure what is and is not permissible, and it
implies that this uncertainty inhibits its ability to carry out its ordinary rateregulation responsibilities vis-a-vis the utilities- responsibilities that certainly
continue at the present time."); cf. Russell C. House Transfer & Stor. Co. v.
United States, 189 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1951) (holding that "no decree should be
so broad as to place the entire conduct of one's business under jeopardy of
punishment for contempt for violating a general injunction").
395. See Pasadena City Bd.of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 439 (1976)
("Because of the rightly serious view courts have traditionally taken of violations of injunctive orders, and because of the severity of punishment which may
be imposed for such violation, such orders must in compliance with Rule 65 be
specific and reasonably detailed.").
396. Fla. Ass'n of Rehabilitation Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Health and
Rehabilitative Servs., 225 F.3d at 1223 (11th Cir. 2000) ("An injunction must be
framed so that those enjoined know exactly what conduct the court has prohibited and what steps they must take to conform their conduct to the law.").
397. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d) ("Every order granting an injunction and every
restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in
terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint
or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained."); See Fla.Ass'n, 225
F.3d at 1223 ("The specificity requirement of Rule 65(d) is no mere technicality;
'[the] command of specificity is a reflection of the seriousness of the consequences which may flow from a violation of an injunctive order.'"); Burton v.
City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1200 (11th Cir. 1999) ("This specificity requirement is necessary "to protect those who are enjoined 'by informing them of
what they are called upon to do or to refrain from doing in order to comply with
the injunction or restraining order.'") (quoting Hughey v. JMS Dev. Corp., 78
F.3d 1523, 1531 (11th Cir. 1996); accord Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 565 F.2d
895, 897 (5th Cir. 1978).
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avoid the serious consequences of contempt."'8 Prophylactic
remedies thus protect defendants' rights while also facilitating compliance with needed relief.
Finally, the specificity of the prophylactic measures enables the practical enforcement of the injunction against
the defendant. 99 For example, a prophylactic remedy requiring defendants to stay 30 or 36 feet away from clinic
property builds in ease of enforcement as contrasted with a
more general order prohibiting "blockading" access to the
property.0 0 The court does not have to determine on a motion for contempt whether the defendant blocked access to
the clinic or obstructed a patient's right to privacy, but simply whether the defendant was 34 or 38 feet away from the
clinic. And the police on the front lines of enforcement can
implement the order using the hard objective criteria of
number of feet rather than the soft subjective meaning of
"blockading." Prophylaxis thus provides needed objectivity
to the amorphous areas of intangible rights and equitable
relief that allows courts to hold defendants accountable.
CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to demystify the prophylactic remedy. Its goal has been to demonstrate the principled
foundation of prophylactic relief in order to dispel the
working assumption of prophylaxis as illegitimate judicial
398. See Spangler, 427 U.S. at 438-39; Payne, 565 F.2d at 897 ("This
command of specificity is a reflection of the seriousness of the consequences
which may flow from a violation of an injunctive order."); Ala. Nursing Home
Ass'n v. Harris, 617 F.2d 385, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1980) ("This requirement of
specificity, 'based in part on notions of basic fairness, ensures that individuals
against whom an injunction is directed receive explicit notice of the precise
conduct that is outlawed.'"). As explained in Wright & Miller's treatise of civil
procedure: Rule 65 serves to "protect those who are enjoined by informing them
of what they are called upon to do or to refrain from doing in order to comply
with the injunction or restraining order. As a result, one of the principal abuses
of the pre-federal rules practice-the entry of injunctions that were so vague
that defendant was at a loss to determine what he had been restrained from
doing-is avoided. The drafting standard established by Rule 65(d) is that an
ordinary person reading the court's order should be able to ascertain from the
document itself exactly what conduct is proscribed." lA WRIGHT, MILLER &
MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF'CML

PROCEDURE 2d § 2955 (1995) (footnotes omitted).

399. See Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 679.
400. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 380 (1997);
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772-73 (1994).
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activism. The term "prophylactic" has become a legal term
of art comprised of precise meaning and power. This
meaning is assumed to be part of the common knowledge of
the lawyer, and indeed, the concept of prophylaxis has become, perhaps unwittingly, deeply engrained in our jurisprudence. By fleshing out the theoretical and doctrinal basis for the remedy, this Article has hoped to advance the
continued and appropriate use of this powerful equitable
remedy.

